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1985 the European Parliament referred the motion
Mr EBEL and others (Doc. B 2-49/85) pursuant to
Procedure to the Committee on External Economic
responsible and to the PoliticaL Affairs Committee
At its sitting of 10 JuLy 1985 the European Parliament referred the motion for
a resoLution tabLed by r"lr MATTINA (Doc. B 2-558/85) pursuant to RuLe 47 of the
RuLes of Procedure to the PoLiticaL Affai rs Committee as the committee
responsi bLe and to the Committee on Externa L Economi c ReLations for an opinion.
At its sitting of 9 September 1985 the European ParLiament referred the motion
for a resoLution tabLed by Mr PORDEA and others (Doc. B 2-643/85) pursuant to
Rule 47 of the RuLes of Procedure to the Cornmittee on ExternaL Economic
ReLations as the committee responsibLe and to the PoLiticaL Affairs Committee
for an opi nion.
At its meeting of 25 September 1985 the committee de.cided to draw up a report
and appoi nted M I" SEELER rapporteu r.
At its meetings of 21 January 1986, 26 September 1986 and 19 November 1986 the
committee exami ned the draft report. On 20 November 1986 it accepted the
motion for a resoLution as a whoLe by 19 votes in favour and 0 against, with 9
abstenti ons.
The following took part in the vote: Dame Shelagh ROBERTS, chai rman;
Mr HINDLEY, vice-chairman; Mr SEELER, rapporteur; Mr AMADEI (deputizing for
Mr Massa ri), Mr BROK (deput i zi ng for Mr van Aerssen), Mr CANO PINTO,
Mr CHRISTENSEN, Mr COHEN (deputi zing for Mrs Wieczorek-ZeuU, Mr FORD
Mr GAUTHIER, Mr GRIMALDOS GRIMALDOS, Mr JANSSEN VAN RAAIJ , Mr KILBY, Mr LUSTER
(deputi zi ng for Mr Constanzo) , Mr McGOWAN (deputi zing for Mr Hitzigrath),
Mr MOORHOUSE, Mr MOTCHANE, Mr MUHLEN, Mr PEGADO LIZ, Mr PONS GRAU, Mr
PRANCHERE (deputizing for Mr Galluzzi),. Mr ROSSETTI (deputizing for r"lrs
CastelLina), Mr SARIDAKIS,
Mr SILVA DOMINGOS, Mr SIMPSON (deputi zing for Mr Escuder Croft), Mr TOLMAN
(deputizing for Mr Zarges), Mr TOUSSAINT and Mr ZAHORKA.
By letter of 30 Apri L 1985 the PoLitical Affai rs Committee informed the
Committee on ExternaL Economic ReLations that it wouLd not deLiver an opinion.
The report was submitted on 3 December 1986.
The deadline for tabLing amendments to this report wilL be indicated in the
draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.
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WG (VS1) 4622E - 4 - PE 107.407/fin.The Committee on ExternaL Economic ReLations hereby submits to the European
Parliament the foLLowing motion for a resolution, together with expLanatory
statement
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on reL3tions between the European Community and the Counci l for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Eastern European member states of the CMEA
The European Parliament,
having regard to its resolution of 11 October 1982 on reLations between
the European Community and the East European State-trading countries and
COMECON (1),
having regard to its resolution of 9 JuLy 1982 on reLations between the
EEC and the COMECON countries in the field of transport policy(2),
having regard to its resoLution of 24 September 1985 on reLations between
the European Cornmunity and the countries of CentraL and Eastern Europe(3),
having regard to its resoLution of 13 June 1986 on trade relations between
the European Community and Hungary(4),
having regard to the motion for a resoLution tabled by Mr EBEL and others
on reLations between the EEC and COMECON (Doc. B 2-49/85),
having regard to the motion for a resoLution by Mr MATTINA on reLations
between the European Community and the Soviet Union (Doc. B 2-558/85)"
having regard to the motion for- a resolution tabLed by Mr PORDEA and
others on the resumption of negotiations between the EECandCOMECON (Doc.
B 2-643/85),
having regard to the report of the Committee on ExternaL Economic
ReLations (Doc. A 2-187/86),
depLoring the absence of poLiticaL freedom which pertains throughout
Eastern Europe,
having regard to the Helsinki FinaL Act and the resuLts of the meetings
following up the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in
Be Lg rade and Mad ~ d,
(1) OJ No. C 292, 8 November 1982, p. 15et seq.
(2) OJ No. C 238, 13 September 1982, p. 96 et seq.
(3) OJ No. C 343, 31 December 1985, p. n'et'seq.
(4) OJ No. C 176, 14 JuLy 1986, p. 192 et seq.
\~G (VS1) 4622E - 5 - PE 107.407/fin.C. stressing that for many years it has wished to contribute towards improving
reLations between the EC and the Member States of the CMEA, provided that
certain preconditions are met,
D. whereas the improvement of trade and poL itical reLations between the EC and
the CMEA wouLd heLp gradually to overcome the problem of the division of
Europe and change substantialLy the spi rit of YaLta with regard to the
division of zones of influence and controL between the two superpowers,
E. in view Df the fact t~at the partition of Europe is contrary to the
tradition of inteLLectual, cultural and economic ties between Eastern and
Western Europe and contributes to the poLarization of world politics into a
power struggle between the two super-powers, and the aim of our policy is
to overcome this division of Europe, reject the lack of freedom experienced
by individuaLs and nations behind the Iron Curtain and strive instead for
the achievement of the right to seLf-determination in aLL parts of Europe,
F. conscious that Europe as a whoLe pLays a vitaL roLe in maintaining and
safeguarding peace in the worLd,
G. aware of the legaL nature and ruLes of the CMEA and the extent of its
competence to act on behalf of the member states of the CMEA" which is
extremely Limited in comparison with the cornpetence of the EC,
H. whereas the USSR is a member of the CMEA and has a powerfuL influence over
thi s organi zation, whi le the USA is not a member of the EC and thus there
is no comparabLe dominant position within the EC, which sees itself as an
economic partner with equaL rights alongside the USA,
I. whereas the CMEA incLudes not only Eastern European countries but aLso
three non-European Member States whose economic and trade interests differ
considerably from those of the otherCMEA countries,
J. having regard to the activities and the agreements reached within the
framework of the Economi c Commi ssion for Europe (ECE) in the sphere of
cooperation between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe,
K. having regard to the recent contacts between theEC and the CMEA and to the
mutual interest in taking up and developing relations, including possible
recognition of the EC;
L. having regard to the positive response by aLL the East European states to
the Commission s offer to normalize their relations with the Community,
M. having regard notabLy to the speciaL' relations obtaining between the
Federal RepubLic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic,
N. whereas the leveLs of development and prosperity of the CMEA countries are
Lower than those of the EC countries, a fact which is largely due to their
extensive commercial isoLation, thei I" autarkic regime and the rigidity of
their economic system,
WG (VS1)4622E - 6 - PE 107.407/fin.O. desiring to improve relations between the EC and the CMEA in aLL possibLe
areas of mutual benefit, and at the same time to improve and extend trade
and economic reLations between the EC and the Eastern European members of
the CMEA"
P. whereas the creation of mutuaLLy advantageous relations couLd be a further
step towa rds mai ntai ni ng peace and ove rcomi ng the pa rti ti on of Eu rope in
the long term and that such a .step is now more important than ever, given
the emerging trend in reLations between the two super-powers
Q. depLoring the frequent recourse by CMEA countries to the dumping of
products on the Community market,
Re reLations between the EC and the CMEA and the member states of the CMEA
1. Regrets that in the eleven years si nCe the fi rst talks were held between
the EC and the CMEA in 1975 neither the CMEA nor any of its member states
has formally recogni zed the EC;
2. Supports the Commission for the consi stent pol icy it has adopted towards
the CMEA as a resuLt of which the Latter has now agreed that the
estabL i shment of relations between the two institutions sha LL not prejudice
bi lateraL relations between the EC and the member states of theCMEA;
3. Looks to the European Community and the Counci L for MutuaL Economic
Assistance to draw up a common declaration in the near future granting each
other mutuaL recognition under international Law and to estabL ish
dipLomatic ties between the East European countries and the Community;
4. Considers that relations between the EC and the CMEA can onLy be deveLoped
and .extended if the latter clearly recogni zes the exi stence of the EC under
internationaL Law as weLL as its competence to act in economic and trade
matters;
5. Recognizes that the establishment of officiaL reLations between the EC and
the CMEA wouLd create a propitious climate for developing reLations with
individual CMEA countries in the fieLd .of foreign trade and cooperation,
but considers that it is unnecessary at this stage to lay down the detai 
of cooperation between the EC and the CMEA in the common decLaration and
that separate negotiations should be heLd to this end foLLowing official
contacts;
Re the possibi lity of reaching agreements between the EC and the CMEA
Expects the EC to activeLy consider the possibiLity of concluding
arrangements with the CMEA, if appropriate, on such matters of mutuaL
interest as faLl within its sphere of competence;
Assumes that parallel negotiations wi LL be opened or resumed between the
EC and the CMEA and between the EC andtheEurop~an member states of the
CMEA on outstanding matters;
Considers that, in the event of such deveLopments occurring, the two
organizations might then di scuss issues such as :
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the approximation of the bases of statistical surveys so ss to faci Litate
exchanges and compari sons of data
the approximation of the methods of economic forecasting"
9. Believes that" in addition to these matters on which an agreement in
principLe had aLready been reached in earlier EC-CMEA taLks, there are
further possibi  ities for mutuaLLy advantageous cooperation which
however, wi LL often requi re more extensi ve preparatory work before they
can be rea L i zed;
10. Considers, in this connection, that the CMEA and the EC might, if
appropriate, hoLd negotiations on envi ronmentaL protection problems
affecti ng both Western and Eastern Europe with the aim of developing
common principLes and standards for permissibLe limit vaLues as regards
pollution in the ai r, soi L, in rivers and in the sea, provided that the
CMEA has authority for these matters;
11. Considers that joint negotiations couLd be held on the deveLopment of
transport infrastructures in Europe, since the current lack of viabLe
transport links between the two bLocs is a serious obstacle to any type of
trade or mutuaL economic reLations;
12. Considers desi rable the deveLopment of an energy system for the whole of
Europe, particularly for the suppLy of electricity, so as to establish a
major inter-European network of energy suppLies and mutuaL services;
13. Considers that the expLoration of new sources of energy, and notabLy
nuclear fusion, but aLso aLternative sources of energy provide ampLe
opportunities for research cooperation;
14. Is anxious in view of the ChernobyL nucLear disaster that in addition to
efforts through the IAEA, cooperation might be .estabLished with CMEA
States as regards reactor security and mutual aid in cases of reactor
maLfunctionings, and that there should be a duty to provide information,
together with exchanges of information and a joint acceptance of
responsi bi L i ty;
15. Considers furthermore, that it wouLd benefit both sides if scientific
cooperation in preciseLy defined areas were stepped up, provided that the
necessary strategic interests of Western Europe are properly guaranteed;
16. BeLieves that the CMEA and its member st.ates are particularly interested
in materiaL cooperation with the EC in this area and that this should be
borne in mind in future negotiations, and notes in this connection the
interest shown by severaL Eastern bloc count ries in the EUREKA research
programme, in which not onLy the Member States of the EC but aLso other
European countries are taking part;
17. BeLieves that serious consideration sh6uLd,be given to ways in which the
number of products requi ring authorization could be reduced, having due
regard to the West' s security interests - i. e. ensuring civiL end-use-
as this might heLp improve and consolidate reLations;
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18. Desi res that, once mutuaL recognition has been secured and the question of
the recognition of the EC by the individuaL member states of the CMEA has
been settLed, consideration shouLd be given to the question of how far it
would be possible to establish parliamentary contacts and set up European
Parl iament deLegations fer reLations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European member states of the CMEA;
Re trade and economic ties with the Eastern European members of the CMEA
19. RecalLs the very considerable disparity between the economic strength of
the Eastern European state-trading countries and of the EC and the effect
this will have on the development of trade and .economic reLations with the
EC;
20. Believes that difficuLt economic .problems wiLL arise as a result of the
different economic structures and that free reciprocal competition wiLL
thus onLy be possible to a very Limited degree so that the EC wi LL receive
nothing comparable in return for faci  itating access to its markets;
21. Draws attention to the adverse effect of the declining price of oil and
the drastic faLL in the exchange rate of the dollar on export revenues
and on those of the USSR and Romania in particular, which has markedly
reduced their ability to take imports from industrialized countries in the
West;
22. BeLieves" however, that an improvement of economic relations wiLL be
politicaLLy useful as regards:
- stabi lity and d6tente in Europe,
- the graduaL eLimination of the partition of
- the implementation of the principLes of the
on Security and Cooperation in HeLsi nki,
- and, in the long-term, the strengthening of
Europe as a factor maintaining peace;
Europe,
F i na l A ct of the Confe renCe
the role of the whole of
23. BeLieves that an immediate graduaL reduction is necessary in compensation
trade between the CMEA and the EC;
24. Stresses the need for the European Community to seek and deveLop new
markets;
25. Considers that in the medium term the Eastern European members of the CMEA
have considerabLe potential as an export market for the EC, notabLy
because of thei I" geographicaL proximity in Europe, thei r considerabLe
reserves of energy and raw .materiaLs, particularLy in the USSR and the
CMEA countries ' great demand for investment and development;
26. WouLd Like the EC to conc Lude trade ~fnd/(:)r. cooperation agreements with the
European member states of the CMEA and thereby to put an end to a
situation which is not governed by treaty and has in severaL cases lasted
for yea rs;
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industriaL products from the CMEA states if they are made much more
competiti Ve;
28. Notes that Romania is the onLy CMEA country with which the EC has so far
concluded a comprehensive trade agreement on industrial goods and that its
agreements with Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are Limited to steeL
texti Les and some agricuLtural products;
29. Welcomes the fact that the Eastern European member states of the CMEA have
now all agreed to the Commission s offer to conclude trade and cooperation
ag reements and recaLLs that in 1974 Romani a a lone accepted the EC' soffer
to conc Lude a trade agreement;
30. Welcomes the current negotiations between the Commission and Romania aimed
at extending the scope of the 1980 agreement so as to extend and deveLop
trade and economic ties between the EC and Romania;
31. Expresses its wish that negotiations between Hungary and other CMEA member
states and the Community should cornmence as soon as possibLe and hopes
that they wi Ll Lead in the near future to an agreement acceptab Le to both
parties;
32. Considers that fruitfuL cooperation is onLy possibLe if the CMEA states
abandon thei I" ideologicaLLy based desi re for self-sufficiency from imports
from the Western industriaL nations;
33. BeLieves that one of the principaL means by which foreign trade poL icy can
generate mutual trust and thus infLuence other areas of poLicy-making is
by strengthening trade contacts and mutuaL interdependence;
34. Is sti LL concerned at the aggressive prices poL icy pursued by state
transport undertakings in CMEA countries which consists in considerabLy
undercutting the freight rates for road and sea transport and so graduaLly
to exclude EC transport undertakings from the market, and calls on the
Commission to bring this matter up notably in future negotiations with the
USSR and to press for a soLution to thi s probLem;
35. Regrets that the Lack of convertibi L ity of CMEA currencies amongst
themseLves and with the currencies of the Western industriaLized nations
continues to hinder the deveLopment of economic reLations;
36. Welcomes Hungary s efforts to make its currency partiaLly convertible;
37. BeLieves that, in trade with the Eastern European CMEA states, the ECU
couLd prove an advantageous moneta ry and fi nanc i a L instrument for the
financing, invoicing and payment of foreign trade transactions; caLLs on
the Commi ssion to exami ne how better use might be made of these
possibi Lities;
38. Calls on the Commission to include the intensification of agricuLtural
trade in trade talks with Eastern European CMEA states with the aim of
stepping up EC agricuLturaL exports to CMEA states and faciLitating the
access of agricuLturaL imports from CMEA countries to the EC market;
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to the deveLopment of trade reLations;
40. Recognizes Romania s efforts to reduce its debts to the West, which,
however, was achieved mainLy by means of drastic import restrictions;
41. Is sceptical about Poland' s ability to master its worsening debt probLem
unaided and believes that possible soLutions should be considered, taking
into account Poland' s abi l ity to pay; insofar as its debts exceed its
capacity to pay, a study should be made to ascertain the feasibi lity of
coLLecti ng the capital and interest payments due in a deveLopment fund in
PoLand and with these resources promoting development projects in the
country (the swaps model) until the Polish economy is in a position to
service and repay this capital in hard currency;
42. Re$erves the right to ratify the arrangements with the CMEA and its member
states negotiated by the Commission and concLuded by the Counci L of
Ministers on behalf of the Community;
43. Inst ructs its President to forward thi s resolution to the Counci l of
Ministers, the Commission, the General Secretariat of the CMEA and the
governments of the Eastern European member states of the CMEA.
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I. Introduction
In preparing this report the rapporteur started by holding discussions
with representatives of the foLLowing embassies in Bonn: BuLgaria
(Mr Georgi Eftimov, ambassador), Poland (Mr Ryszard Ceg lowski and
Dr RemigiusRybicki , counsellors) , Romani a (Mr Ioan Buda, counseLLor),
the Soviet Union (Mr VaLentin Kiporenko, counsellor) and Hungary
(Dr Istvan Horvath, ambassador). No discussions were arranged with the
embassy in Bonn which found it impossible to designate an appropriate
rep resent ati ve.
Czech
The rapporteur then visited East BerLin to discuss with, arnong others,
Professor Nitz (IPW) the DDR' s attitude towards the deveLopment of cLoser
economic contacts between the EC and the CMEA. The rapporteur BLso visited
Moscow and Bucharest and discussed the question of EC-the tMEA relations with
representatives of the Secretariat-General, incLuding the Deputy Secretary of
the CMEA, Mr Kurovsky, representatives of the Institute for WorLd Economic
Affai rs and InternationaL Relations (Professor Shenayev), the head of the
department covering internationaL economic organizations in the Foreign
Mini stry (Ambassador Makeyev) and the deputy Mini ster of Foreign Trade of the
Soviet Union (Mr ManshuLoL
In Bucharest (Romania heLd the presidency of theCMEA in June 1986) the
rapporteur, as the guest of the Romanian group of the Inter-
ParLiamentary Union, had comprehensive discussions on the subject of this
report with, inter alia, the President of the Romanian ParLiament,
Mr Ni koLai Giosan, the chairman of the Romani an group of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Professor Marin Ivascu, the head of the Western Europe
department of the Foreign Ministry" Dr Neagu, representatives of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade incLuding Mr Parvutuoiu, and representatives of the NationaL
Council for EnvironmentaL Protection and the State PLanning Committee.
II.  The deveLopment of the EC' s reLations with the CMEA
ReLations between the European Cornmunity and the CMEA can be divided into
three phases. The first phase, which lasted until about 1971, was
characterized by the totaL rejection of the European Community as something
which couLd deveLop into a new subject of internationaL Law. At that time, as
far as the Soviet Union was concerned theEC was a temporary phenomenon which
shouLd be ignored. It wa.s an economic adjunct to American capitalism and was
compLeteLy disregarded. The 17 theses on the Common Market published in 1957
in the magazine ' Communist' provided ideoLogicaL justification for this
rejection. In the 32 theses on imperiaLi st inte.gration in Western Europe
published in 1962, the European Community was again strongly criticized, but
it was stated at the same time that its existence did not ruLe out cooperation
between the two bLocs in Europe. One of the peopLe to whorn the rapporteur
spoke in Moscow freely admitted that the So\fiet nion had made a mistake by
regarding the European Community for many years as a purely temporary
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objective process ' with which agreement shouLd be reached in order to avoid
commerciaL .and poLiticaL disadvantages. This new attitude was first expressed
in a statement by the then GeneraL Secretary, Mr Brezhnev, in March 1972, and
again in December of that year, when he spoke of recognizing 'realities ' in
Europe. In JuLy 1973 the CMEA approached the EC and indicated its interest in
holdi ng taLks. In May 1974 the EC tounci L declared its wi l lingness to
negotiate trade agreements with each individuaL CMEA member state. In the
talks which then dragged on for severaL years, at LeveLs involving Commission
Presidents and Vi.ce-Presidents as weLL as experts, it became cLear that the
two sides were pursuing different goals. In February 1976, for exampLe, the
CMEA tabled a draft treaty for cooperation between the EC and the CMEA which
was mai nLy concerned with commitments by the member states of both
organizations as regards reciprocaL trade reLations. The counterproposaL
forwarded by the EC to the CMEA on 17 November 1976 provided for working
reLations to be set up between t.he two organi zations on the ba.si s of exchanges
of information on generaL questions such as economic forecasts, production,
consumption, trade statistics, standards and envi ronmentaL protection. Trade
questions, on the other hand, were to be dea Lt with on the basi s of bi latera L
agreements between the EC and the individual member states of the CMEA. The
negotiations continued unti L October 1980 without achieving any results.
To sum up, it can be stated that in these negotiations the EC refused to
sett Le trade quest i ons in a framework agreement. The CMEA had no common trade
poLicy and it was therefore impossible to negotiate with the CMEA in that
. respect. The Community aLso rejected the inclusion of industrial,
technologicaL and scientific cooperation in the agreement, the co-signature of
the agreernent by individual Community Member States, and the establishment,
caLled for by the CMEA, of a joint committee with generaL authority to
consider aspects of mutuaL reLations. It was prepared to make a reference to
the importance of trade between the two parties in the preambLe to a draft
agreement and to incLude a provision under which both sides wouLd commit
themseLves to promoting and deveLoping their trade Links. It nonetheless
insisted that no member country of the CMEA shouLd be obliged to conduct trade
negotiations with the Community against its wi Ll.
For its part, the CMEA insisted on the incLusion in the agreement of trade
poLicy provisions with clauses on most-favoured-nation status, the removaL of
discriminatory ' quantitative restrictions, agriculturaL policy and the scheme
of generaLized preferences. The CMEA also demanded the establishment of a.
joint committee, one of whose responsibilities wouLd be to settle probLems
which might arise from existing or future trade agreements between the
Community and the individuaL CMEA states. This would have meant, however,
that the Soviet Union could intervene di rectly in biLateraL trade relations
between the Community and the CMEA member st.ates. Such a state of affai rs was
not wanted by the Community nor, certainly, by severaL CMEA countries. In the
CMEA' s view onLy ' specific individuaL questions ' should be dealt with in
bilateraL agreements ' on the basis of the principLes of the EC-CMEA
agreernent' The agreement between the two organizations wouLd thereby have
been given precedence over bi LateraL agreements, and would have set out the
guideli neS to be foLLowed by the latter.
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Summit' s FinaL Declaration expressed a wish for reLations to be estabLished
between the CMEA and economic organizations of deveLoped capitaList
countries. The declaration then went on to state that in this connection they
(the CMEA member countries) affirmed their willingness for an agreement to
this effect to be signed between the CMEA and the EC with the aim of promoting
the further development of existing trade and economic relations between the
member countries of the two organizations. After discussing this new
deveLopment, the Counci L of Ministers of the Community decided in September
1984 that a reaction on the part of the Community was not calLed for unti L it
had received a repLy to the letter frorn Mr Haferkamp,. Vice-President of the
Commission, dating from 1981. In October 1984 Mr Haferkamp received a
communication from the CMEA in which it was proposed that negotiations shouLd
be resumed with a view to signing an agreement, a declaration or.some other
document which wouLd cover aLL economic areas, including trade, and be based
on Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Final Document.
This declaration showed for the fi rst time that the CMEA had adopted a more
fLexible attitude and no Longer insi sted on a trade agreement between the two
organizations. EarLy in 1985 Mr Gorbachev himself spoke about the questions
associated with reLations between the EC and the CMEA. During a visit to
Moscow by the ItaLian Prime Minister, Mr Craxi , he stated that it waS time to
set up favourable relations between the CMEA and the Community in the economic
sphere; insofar as the Member States of the EC acted as a singLe poLitical
unit, his side was prepared to find a common Language with the Community in
the sphere of specific international probLems.
Thi s is a cLear signaL that the Soviet Leadership has grasped that the
European Community is in the process of deveLoping into a new poLiticaL factor
in Western Europe. What is not cLear is whether the Soviet Union thinks 
wi II be abLe to use these improved contacts with the EC to dri Ve a wedge
between the European Community and the United States. In the rapporteur
discussions in Moscow, the impression was sometimes given that the increasing
. trade disputes between the EC and the US were being watched with great
interest, in the beLief that this indicated a weakening of the reLationship
between the NATO partners. The rapporteur repeatedLy made it cLear to those
he taLked to that the European Community and the United States are two
independent economic powers between whom disputes might very welt arise
without, however, having .any effect on their cLose partnership in aLL matters
of security. Some of those with whom di scussions were heLd had cLearLy not
yet reaLized that theEC is increasingLy deveLoping, in the medium term, from
an economic community into a poLiticaL community, which wilL then take on a
different aspect in its reLations with both the United States and the Soviet
Union. In the Long term the Soviet Union must expect that the European
Community wi LL increasingLy repLace its Member States with regard to relations
with the Soviet Union, and that the Community of TweLve does not mark the
cuLmination of efforts towards European poLiticaL and economic integration.
ShortLy after the ItaLian Prime Minister s visit to Moscow it became cLear
that the CMEA was now keen to transform the Sovi et leade r' swords into
action. On 14 June 1985, in a communication from its Secretary, the CMEA
proposed opening preLiminary negotiations with the Commission. If the
Community agreed, the CMEA could tabLe the'draft of a common declaration which
had aLready been prepared. One question which sti LL remained unanswered,
however, was whether this dec Laration wouLd aLLow the Community to conclude
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its answer of 29 July 1985, the Cornmission proposed setting up reLations
between theCMEAand the Community through the adoption of a common
declaration. The Community once again decLared its wilLingness to resume the
diaLogue with the CMEA which had been suspended in 1981 and caLled on the
Latter to forward to it the draft dec laration which it had referred to. The
reply from the CMEA Secretary-General on 26 September 1985 included both a
statement of position on the question of bi LateraL relations and a draft
decLaration on the estabLishment of officiaL reLations between the Community
and the CMEA. With regard to bi LateraL reLations it was stated that the
signing of a declaration on the establishment of officiaL relations and the
deveLopment of cooperation between the two organi zations could create a
favourabLe cLimate for the deveLopment of bi lateraL relations between the
Member States of the CMEA and the Community.
This repeated the oLd position of the CMEA and the Soviet Union that reLations
shouLd fi rst be established between the CMEA and the EC and that reLations
between the Community and the CMEA member countries could be deveLoped at a
later stage. In view of the fact that the Community has aLready signed trade
agreements with Romania and other CMEA countries, this position seems out of
date. The fact nevertheless remains that the contracting parties have never
reached the point of establishing formaL reLations. During the initiaL
negotiations, as weLL, it was never clarified by the CMEA side whether the
CMEA states were prepared to normaLize relations with the Comrnuni ty after an
agreement had been signed. NormaLization is taken to mean willingness to
negotiate an overaLL trade agreement with each country, the accreditation of
diplomatic missions with the Community and the abandonment of anti-Community
disruptive action in internationaL organizations. The Community is wilting to
enter into new negotiations with the aim of reaching an appropriate form of
arrangement with the CMEA. The draft common declaration tabLed by the CMEA is
intended to ski rt around the probLems of content on which the negotiations ran
aground in 1980. In terms of its poLiticaL significance the decLaration is
essentiaLLy symbolic.
In February 1986 the Commission responded to the most recent approach from the
Secretary-GeneraL of the CMEA in Letters to the CMEA and the governrnents of
its European member states. The Commission once again indicated to the CMEA
its wilLingness to resume a diaLogue, with the aim of estabLishing officiaL
reLations between the CMEA and the EC. Every avenue, incLuding the
possibiLity of a common decLaration, should be expLored to this end. For its
part the Commission set no preconditions for these taLks, nor priorities as
between the normaLization of bi LateraL reLations between the EC and the CMEA
member states, on the one hand, and the common declaration on the other. The
Commission envisaged, however, that the deveLopment of cLoser reLations
between the two organizations wouLd be pursued paraLLeL to the normaLization
of reLations between the EC and the seven European CMEA member states. The
adoption of a common decLaration couLd thus serve both purposes. In its
separate Letters to the governments of the European CMEA member states the
Commission proposed a normaLization of officiaL reLations with the Community.
Various deveLopments could subsequently be-envis'aged in this context, such as
the negotiation of an overaLL agreement with Romania, the opening of trade
negotiations with Hungary and CzechosLovakia (both countries have indicated
their interest in this) and, to start with, simply the estabLishment of normaL
dipLomatic reLations with the other CMEA states.
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in varying ways, indicated thei r agreement with the Commission s proposaLs.
In the rapporteur s discussions with representati ves of the Eastern European
member states of the CMEA it became cLear that PoLand and BuLgaria are aLso
interested in consoLidating and deveLoping trade relations with the EC. 
the longer term the Soviet Union, too" is open to such trade agreements with
the ECa In view of its special reLations with the Federal Republic of
Germany, particularly as regards trade, the interests of the GDR are somewhat
different from those of the other East European members of the CMEA when it
comes to trade and economic reLations with the Et.
The rapporteur s discussions in Moscow made it cLear that the CMEA is
prepared, without further preconditions, to signa simpLe declaration with the
EC on the normalization of reLations bet.ween the two organizations which wouLd
Leave aLL other questions concerning thei r relations and the relations between
individual CMEA rnember states and the EC to be covered in separate
arrangements.
III. The EC and the CMEA: a compari son of thei I" constitution and legaL powers
The European Comrnunity is an association of states with a particuLar leg.
character. Its Member states are united more closeLy than in the traditionaL
form of international cooperation between state.s. As a supra-nationaL
Community the EC admittedLy stilL counts as a community under international
law, but it aLready has substantial ' nationaL' characteristics. The rnain
difference between it and other internationaL associations of states is that
the Member States of the Community have transferred to it some of their
nationa L rights of sovereignty whi ch are exerci sed by the Communi ty ;n its own
right, with the resuLt that Community Laws and reguLations are directLy
appLicabLe in Law vis-a-vis those subject to its authority and no longer
requi re conversion into nationaL law through ratification by the national
parliaments. These transferred sovereign powers incLude the fieLd of foreign
trade and the right to conc Lude trade agreements with thi rd countries. The
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), on the other hand, is an
internationaL organization of the cLassic type and comparabLe with
internationaL associations of states such as the United Nations, the Council
of Europe etc. The member states of CMEA have not transferred to it any
sovereign rights and the CMEA does not exercise any LegisLative authority
di rectly applicabLe to the citizens of the member countries.
According to its statutes the CMEA has the right to conclude treaties;
however, such treaties are not directLy binding on the member states: their
express agreement is required. InternaLLy the CMEA can adopt recommendations
and resoLutions for its member states, but unanimity is required in every
case. The CMEA has concLuded various agreements, such as cooperation
agreements with YugosLavi a (17. 1964), FinLand (16. 1973), Iraq (4. 1975),
Mexico (13. 1975), Nicaragua in 1982 and Mozambique in 1985.
The creation of a common market or internaL market between its member states
is not one of the aims of the CMEA. Its member states ' markets are national
and cLearLy separate from each other. The.re i~ no restriction on the right of
member states to concLude treaties with other states and groups of states. In
doing so the member states must compLy with the commitments they have entered
into under CMEA arrangements. In this connection, ArticLe 3(1d) of the
statutes states that the Counci l for Mutua L Economi c Assi stance wi L l support
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measures relating to the deveLopment of the exchange of goods and services
between member states of the Counci l and between them and other countries.
The CMEA therefore does not have the right to conclude binding trade
ag reements or economi c cooperat ion ag reements on beha L f of its member states;
onLy the member states have this right. The CMEA can coordinate the foreign
trade poLicy of its members but the .assent of each CMEA member country is
requi red for agreements to be binding.
In the rapporteur s di scussions with representatives of the CMEA secretariat
and in Bucharest with Romanian representatives, it became clear, with varying
degrees of emphasi s, that the CMEA membe.r states jealousLy protect their right
to reach trade agreements appropriate to their individual economic interests
and capabil it i es.
Two other factors rnust aLso be taken int.o consideration: unLike the European
Community the CMEA also includes non-European states, nameLy Cuba, MongoLia
and Vietnam. The trade and economic interests of these countries,
particuLarly their opportunities to trade with the European Community, are
quite different from those of the Eastern European CMEA member states. The
projected common declaration, by means of which the two organizations wilL
establish officiaL relations with each other in international Law, also
incLudes these non-European CMEA member states. In the subsequent talks on
specific areas requi ring agreement, however, it wi II be necessary to
differentiate between the Eastern European and non-European CMEA member
states, and not just for geographical reasons.
A further difference between the EC and the CMEA shouLd be stressed: whi le
one superpower, the United States, does not belong to the European Community,
the Soviet Union, the other superpower, is the Leading member of the CMEA. 
is both a European and an Asiatic state. As the rapporteur repeatedly
. st ressed in hi s di scussi ons in Moscow, for thi s reason a Lone the Eu roPean
Community must make a clear distinction between trade, economic" cultural and
other reLations with the Eastern Eu ropean CMEA countries on the one hand and
with the Soviet Union on the other.
IV. The deveLopment of EC-CMEA reLations: the basis and the potential
(a) The common decLaration
There is now wide agreement that reLations between the EC and the CMEA shouLd
be estabLished on the basis of internationaL Law by means of a common
declaration. This declaration should be brief and succinct and be Limited to
the main aspects of mutuaL reLations. It shouLd contain provi sions for
normaLi zing relations between the CMEA and the EC. ParaLlel to this the
member states of the CMEA would reguLate thei I" economic and trade reLations on
the basis of agreements, and be invited to appoint dipLomatic representation
accredited to the Commission. The usuaL arrangement for this should be that
the diplomatic representation to the Kingdom of Belgium shouLd simultaneousLy
be accredited to the Commission. Conversely, the European Community shouLd
envi sage official representation accredited- to the CMEA either through the
embassy of the Member State hoLding the Cornmunity Presidency, in the initiaL
states, or through the establishment of a separate Community delegation in
Moscow. FinaLLy, this common decL.aration shouLd express the wilLingness of
both sides to enter into negotiations on matters which Lend themseLves to an
agreement between the two organizations, with the aim of reaching agreements
the reon.
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other Eastern European states revealed that theCMEA side is wi LL ing to reach
agreement on this common declaration at an earLy date. It may therefore be
assumed that any controversial matters which might arise wouLd be speedi 
deaLt with and resoLved, and so there should now be nothing to prevent it
being signed, especially since both organizations have repeatedLy announced
their willingness to sign such a decLaration.
(b) PossibLe areas of EC-CMEA cooperation
This section considers the possibLe content of mutually advantageous
cooperation between the EC and the CMEA, starting with areas for which both
the .CMEA and the EC are responsibLe. The rapporteur is aware that in some of
these areas thorough preparatory work is sti LL needed before such cooperation
p roj ects can be tack led.
The foLlowing four .areas emerged from the EC-CMEA negotiations between 1978
and 1980 as possi bLe areas for cooperation btween the two organi zations:
Economi c forecasts
Statistics
Norms and standards
Envi ronmentaL protection.
At the time agreement was reached between the parties invoLved in the
negotiations on these points. The measures reLating to trade cooperation
which were caLLed for by the CMEA at that stage have now been dropped by the
CMEA as areas for cooperation between the two organizations and reLegated to
the LeveL of biLateral agreements.
Cooperation on economic forecasts and statistics wouLd essentiaLLy invoLve the
exchange of information. Moving beyond that, further steps couLd be
considered, however, such as the exchange of information about economic
forecasting methods used, discussions of different statisticaL techniques and
the deveLopment of harmonized statistics techniques with the aim of achieving
and subsequently improving comparability between the statistics pubLished by
both organizations. The starting-point for cooperation on norms and standards
is the fact that uniform norms and standards are applicabLe within the CMEA,
especiaLLy where industriaL products are concerned, and that attempts are aLso
bei ng made in the Communi ty to ha rmoni ze no rms and standa rds. Possi b le
cooperative projects include a systematic comparison of standards appLicabLe
in the CMEA with those in the Community and/or the member states, and the
harmonization of norms and standards with the aim of removing possibLe
barriers to trade.
With regard to envi ronmentaL protection, as earLy as November 1979, on the
basis of the HeLsinki FinaL Act, the reLevant ministers from Eastern and
Western European states heLd a first meeting in Geneva, where a convention on
long-range transboundary ai I" poLLution was drawn up. This couLd be used as a
start i ng-poi nt for EC-CMEA cooperat i on on envi ronmental protect i on. The re
couLd be cooperation on joint research projects to estabLish the extent,
sources and causes of large-scaLe cross-border pollution of the ai I" and
rivers, exchanges of information on environmental protection measures to
reduce or prevent poLLution caused in industry, transport and the home, and a
comparative study of environmentaL LegisLation in the Community and the CMEA.
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Levels of discharges and emissions of pollutants into the air, rivers and
sea. This should include, in particular, a common European standard for Limit
values for industriaL, transport and domestic exhaust gas emissions.
Such programmes for cooperation between the two organizations would initialLy
have to be agreed at poLitical level. Discussions would invoLve the
Commission and the CMEA Secretariat: with the possibLe establishment of a
joi nt committee to prepare and impLement such programmes. The detai led
pLanning of such projects wouLd be handled by groups of experts.
In seeking further areas for cooperation the obvious starting-point is those
areas of activity in which the member states of both organizations cooperate
or which will be pursued jointly by the two organizations. Possibilities to
be considered are basicalLy those areas common to both organizations.
Conversely, those areaS which faLL outside the terms of reference of one or
both organizations have to be ruLed .out. From the List of the CMEA activities
which rneet these requi rements the following could be considered for possibLe
cooperation: scientific and technical cooperation, transport, energy policy
and agriculture. The areas of scientific and technical cooperation between
the CMEA member states taLLy to some extent with the rnain aims of Community
research proje.cts. In the rapporteur s discussions it waS repeatedLy
indicated that EUREKA is one area in which such cooperation is conceivable.
This aLso reveaLs one of the main motives for deveLoping closer reLations
between the CMEA and theEC; the new five-year pLans, which wi LL run from
1986 to 1990, have, on the whoLe, ambitious aims with regard to growth and the
expansion of production. Since the input of additionaL capitaL, raw materiaLs
and labour to achieve these objectives is very Limited, productivity must
increase substantiaLLy. This requires a substantiaL degree of technoLogicaL
know-how, whi ch the CMEA member states do not have avai LabLe, at least at
present, on the requisite scaLe.
In deciding which areas of research may be considered for cooperation, a cLear
distinction shouLd be made between projects with strategic or military
significance and civi l projects. Those with strategic or mi  itary
significance or usefulness cannot be considered for cooperation, but
technoLogies and research areas with pureLy civil appLications shouLd be
included in such cooperation. The end resuLt of the previous refusaL by the
Member States of the Community and its western partners to deLiver such
products to the CMEA states has been to force the Latter to develop the
appropriate technoLogies, such as offshore driLLing technoLogy or robots for
ca I" production, themse L ves and thus become independent of Western supp lies.
One of the areas in which cooperation can benefit both sides is that of fusion
research. Moreover, within internationaL organizations such as the IAEA in
Vienna there is at ready cooperation between the Community and the CMEA member
states with regard to the peacefuL use of nuclear energy. Since this type of
cooperation has proved its worth, it makes sense to encourage it in the
context of cooperation between the two organi zations.
Mainly as a reaction to the American SDI programme, but also as a result of
the imposition of economic sanctions on the Soviet Union and PoLand, following
the declaration of martial Law in PoLand, by the United States and most EC
countries, efforts are being made in Eastern Europe to develop the CMEA more
as a technoLogical community. The outcome of these moves is the combined
programme for scientific and technicaL progress in the CMEA member states by
the year 2000, which was adopted by the CMEA in December 1985. This programme
sets out the following five areas for deveLopment:
WG (VS1 )4622E - 19 - PE 107.407/fin.1. Increased use of eLectronics in the economy
2. Increased automation of mass production
3. Use of nuc Lea I"  ene  rgy
4. New materiaLs and technoLogies and thei r production and processing
5. BiotechnoLogy.
The special feature of these programmes is supposed to be that they cover the
entire cycLe of innovation, from research to the Large-scaLe application of
proven research resuLts in production. This addresses a serious shortcoming
of the process of innovation seen hitherto in the state-trading countries.
The conversion of research results and new technical knowLedge into new and
efficient production techniques and products whi ch increase productivity is
inadequate. This is why the state-trading economy continues to achieve only
about haLf the leveL of productivity of the EC member states and other western
industriaLized countries. As a resuLt, the fact that the Soviet economy can
already point to the achievement of 'firsts ' in certain key technoLogicaL
areaS is often overlooked. Its achievements in space, for exampLe, are
certainLy comparabLe with those of the United States and the Community. The
Soviet economy aLso has notabLe achievements to its credit in the fields of
metaL processing and materiaLs manufacture. This aLso appLies to theoreticaL
mathematics. In the fieLd of energy research the Soviet Union is a world
leader in nuclear fusion technology. Its capabi L ities as regards Laser
research are ona par with those of the western industriaLized countries.
There is sti Ll, however, a considerabLe gap with regard to computer
technoLogy. It is however by no means the case that technoLogical cooperation
wouLd rnereLy benefit the CMEA states; there are many areaS of peacefuL
technoLogies and their appLications in which such an exchange of research
results, and even cooperation, would produce benefits for both sides and couLd
be a fruitfuL development.
FoLLowing the recent deveLopments connected with the safety of nucLear
reactors, there should be cooperation on thi s subject, too, with the aim of
deveLoping optimum common safety standards appLicable on both sides for as
long as nuclear energy is used to produce eLectricity in East and West. 
the rapporteur s discussions space research, where this is for peaceful
purposes, was mentioned as a further area for cooperation. Both sides can
benefit considerabLy from cooperation because the CMEA states have aLready
achieved notabLe research results in some fields. In the event of increased
trade between the CMEA and the EC, questions reLating to transport
infrastructure may become increasingLy important. Transport infr.astructure
pLanning should therefore be a subject of EC-CMEA cooperation.
The price of transport services offered by the CMEA countries, however, is
also a topicaL transport issue. For years the Community has compLained about
a deliberate policy to eLiminate competition based on price dumping. The
undercutting of freight rates appLicabLe in the Community has meant that an
increasing proportion of both exports to and imports from the CMEA countries
is carried by ships and lorries beLonging to the CMEA member states. A
soLution to these probLems shouLd be sought both between the two organhations
and also in bi LateraL negotiations.
In the energy sector the possibilities foreoop~ri'ltion between the EC and the
CMEA include the extension of energy suppLy networks such as gas and oi 
pipeL i neS and the development of an electri city grid system. Energy research
e. the development of new, aLternative sources of energy, is another area in
which theCMEA and the EC can cooperate.
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projects couLd be put forward whi.ch couLd be impLernented on a cooperative and
basis which couLd benefit both sides. There is, however, a major obstacle to
cLoser cooperation between the EC and the CMEA in the confLicts of ideoLogy
and power poLitics.
In the EC trade within the Community, but aLso the deveLopment of worLd trade
under GATT ruLes, has made a major contribution to the substantiaL increase in
standards of Living and prosperity over the Last few decades. The further
deveLopment of these economic reLations is one of the main aims of the European
Economic Community. Cooperation among the CMEA member states, on the other
hand, is essentially aimed at gradualLy reducing dependence on suppLies,
particuLarLy of advanced technology but also of agricuLturaL products, from the
Western industriaLized nations. One of the obje.ctives of deveLoping cLoser
relations with the EC is to achieve this airn more quickly with the help of
estern technoLogy. However, this is a nota good basis for long-term
cooperation between the ECand the CMEA in Europe. To this extent, Long-term,
fruitfuL cooperation aLso requires a rethink on the part of the CMEA. There
is another factor to be considered: whi Le the United States, i. e. one of the
superpowers, is not a member of the EC, the CMEA is orientated internaLLy
towards the dominating superpower, the Soviet Union. IndustriaL cooperation
and speciaLization are organized with Little regard for the Law of comparative
cost benefits, but rather according to the basic ruLe that the Soviet Union
suppLies raw materials and energy in exchange for high quaLity industriaL
products. This orientation of economic structures is aLso aimed at making the
CMEA independent of the rest of the world economy. RationaL Long-term
cooperation between the CMEA and the EC can onLy deveLop in the Long run to
the benefit of both sides if they both intend to regard it, inter aLia, as a
means of bringing the European states together.
(c)  Trade and economic reLations between the EC and the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European member states of the CMEA
There have naturaLly been differing reactions to the Gorbachev initiative from
the European CMEA states. ALL of them, without exception, are interested in
improving their trade and economic reLations with the Community. The PoLish
response has been particularly positive. This is probabLy connected with
underLying expectations of major poLiticaL, economic and financiaL benefits.
Bulgaria has aLso reacted very positiveLy; in conversations with the
rapporteur both Bulgarian and PoLish representatives expressed the hope that
economic and trade negotiations with the Community couLd start immediateLy the
joint declaration was agreed. The comparativeLy reticent reaction of Hungary
and Romania is aLso understandabLe; there has for some time been a
flourishing exchange of views between both states and the European Community.
Romania has aLready formaLized its economic reLations with the EC in a trade
agreement. Both countries are primari Ly concerned that the improvement in
relations between the EC and the CMEA should not be to the det riment of thei 
bi LateraL reLations and negotiations with the Community. For its part,
CzechosLovakia hopes that the improvem.ent in reLations between the two
organizations wiLL enabLe it to improve its own economic reLations with the
EC. FinaLLy, there is a pLausible reason for the very reticent attitude of
the GDR; the special nature of trade between the GDR and the FederaL RepubLic
of Germany would be bound to be discussed in the event of negotiations on
improving reLations between the CMEA and the EC~' ConsequentLy,the GDR is
particuLarly keen on the soLution which has now been found of hoLding paraLLeL
negotiations between the two organizations and, on a bi LateraL basis, between
the individuaL Eastern European states and the Community.
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is the enormous differences in their economic power and economic structure.
They aLL expect that the common decLaration on the estabL ishrnent of reLations
between the EC and the CMEA wi LL gi Ve them the requi site eLbow room to make
the most of thei r national economic interests in bi LateraL negotiations.
Over the past 25 years exports from the Community to the European CMEA states
and ALbania have increased from 1 367 million ECU (1960) to 22 505 miLLion ECU
(1985). Imports into the Community frorn the CMEA st.ates increased from 1 504
mi LL ion ECU to 33 122 mi LL ion ECU over the same period. The EC had a trade
deficit with Eastern Europe in the 1960s which improved at the beginning of
the 1970s, became a surpLus between 1972 and 1978 and reverted to a deficit in
1979. The size of the deficit has steadi Ly increased since then, reaching a
record 13 600 million ECU in 1984. Last year imports decLined by 5.2% to 33
100 million ECU. Exports incre.ased at the same time by 5. 5% to 22 500 milLion
ECU, so that the community s trade deficit with Eastern Europe feLL to 10 600
mi LLion ECU. One major reason for these changes is the development of energy
prices. The Soviet Union, in particular suppl ies considerabLe quantities of
oi L and natural gas to the Community. On the other hand, severaL CMEA
countries have huge hard-currency debts and are seeking to use exports not
onLy to cover their interest payments but also to reduce their LeveL of
indebtedness. In the last four years the GDR and Romania, in particuLar, have
managed to reduce thei I" debts to the West significantly.
The faLL in the voLume of foreign trade acceLerated further in the fi rst haLf
of 1986: EC imports from the USSR dropped by 19% (January-May), and EC
exports to the USSR aLso feL L by 21%. EC imports from the Eastern European
states taken as a whoLe showed a decline of 14%, whi Le EC exports to those
countries were 11% down on the same period in 1985. The CMEA states affected
by the faLL in energy prices c Learly pref~r to adjust those of thei I" imports
from the Western industriaL countries which must be paid for in foreign
exchange to the reduced leveL of income from exports, rather than makeup for
this discrepancy through new hard currency debts. This means that the
prospects for East-West trade are, for the time being at least, not very good.
Over the years trade with Eastern Europe has becoming increasingLy important
for the Community. WhiLe it only accounted for 5.3% of the Community
foreign trade in 1960, in 1975 the figure waS 8.3% and in 1984, 7.7%. It thus
comes ahead of Community trade with the ACP States (5. 6%), but is considerabLy
Less important than Community trade with the other European states (27. 5%).
For the CMEA countries the most important trading partner within the EC is the
Federal RepubLic of .Germany. Last year nearly 43% of aL L the goods exported
from the Community to the CMEA state.s came from the FederaL Republic, which in
turn accounted for about 31% of aLL imports from the CMEA states. The Federal
Republic s trade balance with the CMEA' stateshas DnLy shown a sizeable
deficit since 1984, when it was almost 1 100 million ECU. In 1985 it declined
to 657 mi lL ion ECU.
Other important trading partners for the CMEA countries within the EC are
ItaLy (18%), France (15%) and the Netherlands (10%). ItaLy and the
NetherLands have the largest trade deficits with Eastern Europe (3 000 mi LL ion
ECU and 3 400 m ECU respectiveLy in 1985). 
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Union. Last year it accounted for 61% of aLL the CMEA exports to the
Community and for just on 53% of aLL Community exports to the CMEA. However,
in relation to its share of Eastern Europe s gross domestic product, which was
about 73% in 1984, the Soviet Union s trade with the EC is not as important
as, for instance, Hungary s, which accounted for 3% of Eastern Europe s GDP in
1985 and about 8% of EC-CMEA trade, Poland' s (7% of GDP, 11% .of trade) or
Romani a' s (3% of G DP, 7% of trade).
Trade with Eastern Europe is far more important for the Comrnunity than it is
for the other Western industrialized countries. In 1983, for example, it
accounted for only 1. 1% of the totaL foreign trade of the United States, and
7% in the case of Japan. The greater importance of the CMEA states as
trading partners for the Community can be expLained in terms of both thei r
greater geographicaL proximity, compared with the United States and Japan, and
the structure of foreign trade. The Community is far more dependent on energy
imports than the United States and the Soviet Union suppLies a substantiaL
proportion of these. ALthough the United States is one of the main exporters
of agriculturaL products to the Soviet Union, the latter s chief imports are
of industriaL products and fini shed goods, and the range avai Lable from the EC
offers a better deaL.
The huge hard-currency foreign debts of a number of the' CMEA member countries
constitute a particuLar problem. At the end of 1985 the CMEA foreign debt
stood at about US $ 72 500 mi lL ion, compared with US $ 79 200 m in 1981. The
creditworthiness of most CMEA states, especiaLly the GDR, has thus improved on
the internationaL finance markets. On the other hand, however, the CMEA
states' ability to irnport continues to be strictly limited, because export
earnings have to be usedmainLy to service foreign debts and not to pay for
imports of products which are often urgent Ly needed. Poland, whose debt
increased from US$ 24 500 mi LL ion in 1980 to US $ 27 800 mi LL ion at the end
of 1984, continues to be a speciaL case. Its hard-currency export earnings
are sti LL not enough to service its debt. A further increase in Polish
indebtedness, whi ch even in 1984 accounted for 42% of the tota l the CMEA debt,
can therefore be expected. This constitutes a huge drag on PoLand' s economic
recovery and development. In addition to these debt probLems the Community
market' s ability to absorb imports and, in this connection, the CMEA
countries ' competitiveness in this market, set cLear Limits to any rapid
increase in the voLume of trade. The Community s abi L ity to import
agricuLturaL products from the CMEA states is reLatively Limited because of
the particuLar effects of the Community s agricultural policy on its own food
production. It can take industriaL products, machinery and the Like provided
that the exporting countries are able to meet the high quality standards
demanded by the Community market. In overaLL terms, the deveLopment and
expans i on of trade bet ween the CMEA stat es and the EC wi l L ma in Ly depend on
improved competitiveness and abi  ity to suppLy with regard to these products.
(d) The roLe of GATT in EC-CMEA economic reLations
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) can at best be a stop-gap as
far as the deve lopment of close r economi c r€ Latj9ns between East and West is
concerned. Cooperation between the western industrialized nations and the
CMEA states within GATT is mainly detrimentaL to the former, owing to the
different structures of the free market economy, on the one hand, and the
state-planned economy, on the other. On joining GATT the CMEA countries
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cannot grant their trading partners fuLL most-favoured-nation status. This
foLlows from the differences between the two economic systems" which are
essentiaLLy as follows: the principLe, fundamentaL to GATT, of most-favoured-
nation status (non-discrimination against trading partners) and the principLe
of reciprocity, which is not explicitLy referred to in GATT, but which is
nonetheLess of fundamental importance. In a state based on a planned economy,
with a foreign trade monopoly, it is in the nature of things that it wi 
constantly violate the ban on quantitative import restrictions. Strictly
speaking, the principLe of reciprocity cannot be appLied, because in most
Communist countries there are no customs tariffs as defined by GATT.
Consequently, there can be no quid pro quo for the tariff preferences granted
under GATT. Before joining GATT, PoLand, Romania and Hungary therefore had to
negotiate special accession terms to balance the concessions they gained.
This also appLied to Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that it was a founding
member; other countries wanted to be abLe to protect themseLves against its
export dumping. FinaLLy, despite the special rules thus negotiated (which do
not, however, balance out the trade benefits gained), the Communist members of
GATT enjoy virtuaLLy unLimited room for manoeuvre, which they are unable to
grant thei r trading partners. Within GATT the western countries forgo many
instruments for regulating their trade with theCMEA countries, while the
Latter, when it comes down to it, retain aLL their previous decision-making
powers. GATT membership on the part of state-trading countries therefore
presupposes that the western member countries are prepared to accept
compromises which favour one side more than the other.
The refusal of the GATT signatories at their recent ministerial conference in
Punta deL Este, Uruguay, to aLLow the USSR observer status at the coming round
of muLtilateraL trade negotiations has shown once again that the incLusion of
such a Large state-trading country as the USSR in the GATT world trade order
is at present viewed by many states as impossibLe or undesirable.
(e)  The agency of the InternationaL Monetary Fund
The International Monetary Fund has hitherto, given its terms of reference,
been unabLe to make any contribution to improving trade reLations between East
and West. Nor was it in a position to prevent the decLine in trade with
Romania and Hungary. However, these two CMEA countries are aLso the onLy ones
whose deveLopment can be poi nted to as an examp Le of the IMF' s effecti veness
because PoLand and Czechoslovakia left the IMF at the beginning of the 1950s,
aLthough PoLand has now rejoined. The Soviet Union never became a member
aLthough it took part in the negotiations Leading to its estabLishment.
Why do the GDR and the Soviet Union seem so disinclined to join the IMF?
(Thi s has been true of the Latter at least in the past. Apart from the
negative attitude of the United States" fundamentaL reservations about the
requirement to disclose information about the goLd and currency sector and the
current pol icy on reserves, which guarantees domination by the Western states,
militate against the accession of the Soviet Union, and probabLy the GDR as
weLL. In addition, the Soviet economy s susceptibility to disruption (Large
raw materiaLs reserves, limited foreign trade, "!i!tc. ) is relatively smaLL so
that it has- at Least in the past -had Little need of internationaL
cooperation. The same is true of the GDR, which regards its trade and credit
relations with the West as so stable that it does not need the IMF. Now
however, the USSR is showing increasing interest in strengthening
international economic ties. It remains to be seen what the consequences wi LL
be.
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were often criticized as being too rigid, may have a negative effect on the
economy of a country accepting IMf Loans. With the Loan pol icy impLemented
hitherto the conditions attached to the Loans may not onLy restrict trade in
the short term, but also serve as a long-term brake on economic growth.
Romania s and Hungary' s membership of  the IMF was usefuL when they were
undergoing major crises, in that it reduced the financiaL pressure and created
conditions in which (in the case of Hungary) the flow of private capitaL aLso
resumed. However, Romania wouLd have come through its crisis without IMF
pressure. Its adjustments with regard to foreign trade wouLd have been
virtually the same even without the IMF. The measures aimed at the domestic
market did not work. This also applies to Hungary. The reason for thi s
fai Lure on the part of the IMF is that loans are not madeavai Lable as long as
a country has no acute baLance-of-payments problems. In this situation
however, even without pressure from the IMF countries which need Loans are
forced to make adj ustments, i. e. to curb East-West trade at least in the
medium term. Since the IMF can therefore onLy intervene when the situation
has vi rtuaLly reached breaking-point, it is often so Late that the rneasures
taken no Longer rea l Ly work.
It would therefore make sense to strike a balance between taking the requisite
action to reduce deficits and keeping the economy of the country concerned
going. C Loser cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank would therefore
be appropriate in future, because the IMF is now moving more towards
Longer-term financing and is less concerned with short-term measures to
correct baLance-of-payments problems. The IMF couLd contribute to the
deveLopment of East-West trade if its instruments were improved, i. e. if its
measures took effect sooner.
(f) The task of the WorLd Bank with regard to EC-CMEA economic reLations
Membership of the WorLd Bank, unLike that of the IMF and GATT, contributes to
the deveLopment of East-West trade. - As the onLy Communist members so far,
Romania and Hungary, for exampLe, are classed by the IMF (membership of which
is a precondition for membership of the WorLd Bank) and the WorLd Bank as
deveLoping countries, and are therefore able to obtain World Bank funds for
Long-term finance for specific projects and structuraL adjustment Loans. Not
Least because of thei I" Long-term basi s (up to 20 years) these loans are an
ideaL source of capitaL and give the countries obtaining them more Latitude in
East-West trade.
The favourabLe reLationship between the capital to be paid in and the loans
obtained have benefited both countries; the boost provided to East-West trade
goes far beyond the financial input from the WorLd Bank. It has been
caLcuLated that every doL Lar it makes avai labLe actuates another two doL Lars.
For Hungary, however, the WorLd Bank' s co-financing programmes are even more
important. The WorLd Bank participates in deveLopment projects in which the
buLk of the Loans comes from private bank consortia, so that the WorLd Bank'
small share generates a Large amount of credit.. In practice this has meant
that on average credit amounting to eight times ihe sum given by the WorLd
Bank has been made avai LabLe.
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The role of the Economi c Commi ssion for Europe (ECE) in East-West
cooperation
The Commission, which was set up by the Economic and Social Counci l of the
United Nations in 1947, compr; SeS aLL the European countries, the USA and
Canada. Its task is to maintain and promote economic ties among the European
states and between them and the rest of the wor Ld. The ECE meets at one
annual pLenary conference.
Its most important spheres of action are anaLyses and forecasts of economic
deveLopment in the member states, energy questions, envi ronmentaL probLems and
transport matters. These reports are prepared in the relevant speciaLized
cornmittees. Conventions are drawn up on important areas and subrnitted to the
members of the ECE for signing and ratification. Thus at the beginning of the
1980s, for example, a convention was agreed on combating long-range
trans-frontier air pollution. In the sphere of transport a study was recentLy
drawn up on generaL European transport infrastructure needs up to the year
2000.
The ECE' s activities can be seen as an important contribution to bui Lding
confidence and pr.omoti ng cooperation between the states of Eastern and Western
Europe. The EeE was given the poLitical impetus it needed by the HeLsinki
Fi naL Act and the deci s;ons of the foLLow-up conferences. The ECE has aLso
been a valuable forum for discussion in times of tension betweenE.ast and
West. Future cooperation between the EC and the CMEA and its member states
can bui Ld on the work of the ECE, whi Le the efforts of the ECE shouLd aLso be
stimuLated in the process.
The individuaL CMEA countries
(a) BuLgaria
BuLgaria s economy has experienced continuous growth over the past few
decades, but thi s deveLopment began from a very Low starti ng-point in the
mid-1940s. Since then, BuLgaria s gross domestic product has increased
14-foLd, industrial output 84-foLd and agricuLturaL production has tripLed.
In 1984 20% of the working population was empLoyed in agricuLture and 36% in
industry. The shift from extensive to intensive economic growth has been the
main aim of economic poLicy in BuLgaria. The ' new economic mechanism ' which
was introduced in 1979 for agricuLture and in 1982, somewhat modified, for the
economy as a whoLe, is intended to ensure greater flexibility ;ncentral
pLanning. The aim is to improve the quality of goods and services through
Limited decentraLization and provide greater freedom to take decisions at the
LeveL of undertakings. Prices, wages, investment decisions and export
reLations, however, continue to be under centraL controL.
Three quarters of BuLgaria s foreign trade is with other CMEA states; the
main trading partner is the Soviet Union, which has accounted for 53. 5% of
exports and 59. 7% of imports over the Last five years. Only 7. 9% of exports
went to Community countries, which provided 9 ~% of Bulgaria' s imports.
BuLgaria buys mainLy chemical products" finished goods, machinery and vehicles
from the Community, and exports mainLy oi L, agricuLtural products and finished
goods to the Community. In overalL terms BuLgaria s exports have increasingLy
deveLoped away from agriculturaL products and raw materiaLs towards products
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more than 50% of BuLgaria s exports. BuLgaria traditionally has a trade
deficit. In 1985 the deficit was us $ 245 million. The cumuLative deficit
with the Soviet Union for 1981-1984 was 3 100 miLLion transferabLe roubLes
(TRbD and was us $ 1 700 mi LL ion with the OECD countries. Even so, BuLgaria
has substantiaLLy reduced its foreign debt over the last few years. It is
estimated that at the end of 1985 it owed western banks less than US $ 100
mi l~on. Its total debt is probabLy about US $ 1 300 mi ltion.
In the new five-year pLan, in addition to the energy sector, the emphasis wi 
be on modernizing industry. This shoutdgenerate an increased demand for
western technology, but also for foreign capitaL.
(b) PoLand
PoLand' s economy continues to be under great strain. The country is trying to
drag itseLf out of the (mainLy seLf-inflicted) economic crisis that deveLoped
after 1979 as a resuLt of its irresponsibLe accumuLation of debts with the
West. Since 1982, when a three-year plan was introduced, output in aLL
sectors of the economy has admittedly increased substantiaLLy, but it is sti II
below the 1979 Level. A Large proportion of investments is sti Ll going to
projects which were started in the 1970s but have not yet been compLeted.
Thi s further Limits the resources avai LabLe for important new investment
projects for moderni zation and rationaLi zation.
PoLand is attempting to exert a positive influence on deveLopments through
various economic reforms. The aim is that the basic units of the PoLish
economy, for exampLe, shouLd be independent, seLf-financing and seLf-
administered undertakings. Direct, binding state planning is to be Limited to
a few key areas, namely infrastructure, sociaL pol icy, defence and security
and the CMEA cooperation. In addition, the state only intends to intervene
indi rectLy, using instruments of the market economy such as interest rates,
taxes, prices, credit and exchange rates. The impLementation of these reforms
is provi ng very slow.
PoLand has had a smalL baLance-of-trade surpLus since 1982. This resuLts from
trade with the western industriaLized nations and deveLoping countries, but
not from trade with its eight CMEA partners, although they are Poland' s most
important trading partners. The Soviet Union, for exampLe, accounts for about
a thi rd of PoLand' s foreign trade, whi le the Community s share is about 20%.
Poland has succeeded in increasing exports of coaL, its most important export
product, but it has so far fai Led to develop any significant export markets in
the West for its machinery and electrical goods. Despite an export surpLus of
some us $ 281 mi LL ion in 1985 Poland' s hard-currency debt has increased to
just on US $ 29 000 mil  ~on  at the end of 1985. Debt reschedu Li ng
negotiations with western creditors are proving difficuLt because PoLand is
frequent Ly not even ab Le to clear outstandi ng i nte rest payments from p revi ous
rescheduling agreements. PoLand' s new five-year pLan aLso prescribes an
increase in labour productivity and lower consumption of energy and raw
materiaLs. The pLanned growth rate of 3. 5% on average, however, wi Ll not be
enough to get back to the output Leve l of 1978. It is pLanned to use a
quarter of the hard currency earned from exports to the West to service
Poland' s debt. This wilL not be enough, howevew" to meet its annuaL
commitments. As a resuLt, the unpaid interest payments wi Ll add further to
Poland' s indebtedness. VirtuaLLy no western capital is availabLe for PoLand'
development.
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Unl i ke most CMEA member states Czechoslovakia is an industriaL country through
and through. IndustriaL production accounted for about 63% of economic output
in 1982; ove I" t he Last few yea rs Labour sho rtages and  ene  rgy bott Lenec ks have
sLowed down the growth of the Czech economy to a marked extent. Manufacturing
activities onLy picked up again in 1983. In 1984 gross domestic product
i nc reased by 3. 2%.
In Czechoslovakia, as weLL, the shift from extensive to intensive economic
deveLopment is one of the main aims of economic poLicy. In 1984, for example,
there was a substantial increase in productivity and a substantial tall in
consumption of energy and raw materiaLs. The efficiency of the Czech economy
is to be increased through improvements in central planning methods. One key
aspect of thi s is close Li nks between undertaki ngs and thei r export
customers. Since 1981 export undertakings have had more .say in foreign trade;
they can now i nf luence selling and pri ces to a greater extent. 
Czechoslovakia, as in the other CMEA member states, however" foreign trade is
mainLy sLanted towards felLow CMEA members. More than three-quarters of aLL
its for.eign trade takes pLace within the CMEA, the dominant trading partner
being the Soviet Union with a 45% share. Over the last five years the EC'
share of C~ech export trade has averaged about 10%. For years
Czechoslovakia s imports and exports have approximateLy balanced. In 1985
there was a deficit of US $ 77 miLlion.
The Community mainLy suppLies machinery, vehicles, finished goods and
chemicaLs to Czechoslovakia, purchasing in return raw materials, energy and,
in particular, finished goods. As a proportion of Czech foreign trade, trade
with the West has decLined over the past ten years. One of the reasons for
this is the increasingLy stringent conditions attached to the purchase of
modern technoLogy from the West. This has Led CzechosLovakia, in turn, to
deveLop advanced technologies for its CMEA partners and to assume the role of
main supplier of such products within the CMEA.
Since 1980 Cze.chosLovakia has not taken up any further credit from the West.
As a resuLt of the surpLus earned on its trade with the West, by the end of
1985 Czechoslovakia had succeeded in reducing its debt to US $ 2 100 miLLion.
This process wiLL probabLy continue, so that C~echosLovakia does not face any
probLems in this area. For this reason, and also because Cz.echoslovakia
offers a very wide range of industrial products which certainLy have a good
chance of being competitive in western markets, there are good prospects for
trade between the EC and CzechosLovakia expanding in the years ahead.
(d) Romani a
Romania s economy, which used to be based mainLy on agriculture, forestry and
energy production, has undergone rapid industriaLization in the Last 15
years. The industriaL sector now accounts for about 60% of output. The
growth rate of industriaL production, which in the 1970s reached an annual
average of over 11%, has declined to an average of 4% in recent years.
Romania, too" has aLLowed the management of undertakings greater fLexibi  ity
by reLaxing centraL controLs, but the centr-aL p.~anning system continues to be
strictly adhered to. The bureaucracy is too bLoated for far-reaching reforms
in this respect to be impLemented in the short term. Very recently economic
growth ha.s picked up again to some extent, but the standard of Living
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shortages. Foodstuffs are rationed, as is fueL outside Bucharest, when it can
)e found at alL. In 1984 reaL average incomes even decLined by 0.5%.
Romanian foreign trade is divided aLmost equaLly between Communist and western
countries. The Soviet share is about 20%, while the Community accounts for
17% of Romanian foreign trade. About half of the Community s imports from
Romania are in the form of energy. The main products exported from the EC to
Romania are chemicaL products, machinery, vehicles and other finished goods.
By drasticaLly cutting its imports Romania has achieved an increasing trade
surpLus since the beginning of 1980. A surpLus of US ~ 1 400 million was
achieved in 1985 alone. The main aim of this policy has been to secure
hard-currency surpluses to meet its debt servicing commitments without further
debt rescheduLing.
In this way Romania succeeded in reducing its hard-currency foreign debt from
US . 10 000 million in 1981 to some US . 6 100 million at the end of 1985.
Romani a i s $eeki ng to reduce its foreign debt over the next few years to a
poi nt where a substantiaL proportion of export earni ngs can be .used to pay for
the imports especi aLLy techno Logi ca L products, whi ch it needs. Thi s is
essentiaL if the aims of the new five-year plan, namely the rapid introduction
of advanced eLectronic and robot technoLogy" are to be achieved.
Romania constantLy stresses its independence as regards its foreign trade
Links. This is clearly indicated by the proportion of Rornanian foreign trade
accounted for by western countries, which is high compared with other CMEA states. Romania is the onLy CMEA country to have an agreement with the
Community, signed in 1980, on the exchange of industriaL products and the
creation of a joint committee at ministeriaL level. Since then both sides
have sought to deveLop these formaL Links. There is a wish to incLude the
ag~cultural sector and extend economic and trade cooperation. The Romanian
economy s efficiency and ability to deLiver wi LL probabLy set fai rLy low
Limits to any rapid expansion in economi c reLations between the Communi ty and
Romani a.
The European market is LargeLy saturated with Romania s traditional exports
such as agricuLturaL products, texti I.es and steeL, and scarceLy able to absorb
new products. DeveLoping cooperation between Romanian and Community
undertakings will aLso not be easy, because interest on both sides is
necessary for this. The rigid Communist pLanned economy in Romania limits the
prospects of such cooperation bei ng worthwhi Le for Community fi rms.
(e)  Hungary
Since the beginning of the 1970s Hungary s economic deveLopment has revoLved
around a new system of economic management, the ' new economic mechanism
This is intended to reconcile state planning and market trends. In some
sectors i ndust ry has been decentra L i zed; the estab L i shment of pri vate
undertakings is encouraged. These are mainLy small private firms or
cooperatives which are able to lease machinery and equipment from the state.
Improvements in the conditions applicabLe to joint ventures are aimed at
attracting more foreign capital to Hungary. Banking has also been
decentralized; the Hungarian National Bank-has. ransfered its operations to
two new banks. The country is aLso trying to improve the efficiency of the
Hungarian economy through a ne.W pricing system. Domestic price structures are
being brought into Line with prices on worLd markets.
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new agreements were signed, thereby bringing the number of joint ventures with
firms frorn 23 count~es to 46. Half of these were with companies from the
FederaL RepubLic of Germany, foLlowed by partners in France, ItaLy and the
United Kingdorn. Most cooperative ventures are in the engineering industry,
which accounts for some 5% of Hungary s exports to the West.
Since the beginning of the 1980s Hung.ary has had a growing foreign trade
surpLus. Ih 1985 the trade surpLus was US $ 791 million. Its main trading
partner is the Soviet Union, whose share in the total voLume of foreign trade
has recentLy fallen sLightly to 32%. Machinery and equipment are the main
exports to the Soviet Union, whi Le the main imports from that country are
energy and raw materiaLs. Almost 20% of Hungarian foreign trade is with the
European Community, haLf of it with the FederaL Republic of Germany. Hungary
purchases mainly machinery, vehicLes" finished goods and chemicaL products
from the Community, and in return supplies agricuLtural products and finished
goods.
At the end of 1985 Hungary s hard-currency debt amounted to about US $ 8 300
miLLion; the hard-currency trade surpLus means that servicing this debt
presents no major probLems for the Hungarian economy. Hungary would like to
forrnaLize its economic reLations with the Community in a trade agreement.
Under the new five-year pLan Hungary is aiming for an annual increase in
production of 3-4%. The foreign trade objectives are baLanced imports and
exports with the CMEA states and an annuaL surplus of US $ 600-700 million
with the West. Hungary is seeking to increase its trade with the Community by
10-20%, which it aLso regards as achievabLe in view of market opportunities in
the Community.
(f) The Soviet Union
Since themid-1970s the Soviet economy has been faced with a noticeable
slow-down in the rate of economic growth. This reflects the shrinking
opportunities for extensive economic deveLopment. The labour market potentiaL
is virtuaLLy static and raW materials and fossil fueLs are becoming more
expensive as thei I" expLoitation becomes more difficult. In overaLL terms the
increase in productive resources has sLowed down appreciably. The rate of
economic growth actuaLly achieved continues to be based mainLy on an increase
in empLoyment, the expansion of manufacturing capacity and increased
consumption of energy and raw materiaLs. If a steadi ly higher rate of growth
is to be achieved it is essential to increase productivity. With the Limited
resources avai LabLe in terms of Labour, energy and raw materiaLs, however, it
is imperative to modernize and automate production methods, in particuLar.
This is one of the main reasons for the Soviet Union s efforts to deveLop
closer economic and trade reLations with the West.
The Soviet Union traditionally has a trade surpLus (US $ 4 000 miLlion in
1985, for exampLe), which comes not onLy from trade with other the CMEA
members, but also from that with the industrialized West and deveLoping
countries. In 1984 the overall trade surplus was about TRbL 9 000 mi LLion..
Of this figure the Communist countries accounted for TRbl 3 900 million, the
western industriaLized countries for TRbL 1 800 miLlion and the developing
countries TRbl 3 400 million. About half the Soyiet Union s foreign trade is
with other CMEA countries. Between 1981 and 1985 the European Community
accounted for 17% on average. The FederaL Republic of Germany is the main
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ItaLy (3.2%) and France (3. 1%). The Soviet Union mainLy exports energy.
Machinery, vehicles and other finished goods represent only 6% of its exports
to the West. The Soviet Union imports finished goods, machinery, vehicles,
foodstuffs and chemicaLs from the European Community.
The Soviet Union s hard-currency debt was about US $ 19 000 million at the end
of 1985; asa result of its trade surpLus, servicing this debt has not proved
a probLem hitherto.
The main aim of the new five-year plan is to ~peedup scientific and technicaL
progre~s. This means concentrating resources on the development of
electronics, nuclear energy, automation and technoLogies for the production
and processing of new materials. The level of automation in the nationaL
economy is to be doubLed and the introduction of modern data-processing
equipment speeded up considerabLy. The reLationship between science and
production is to be improved, mainly by deveLoping cLoser links between
research institutes and undertaki ngs. It is hoped that in thi s way research
resuLts will find their way into actuaL production more quickLy, thereby
ensuring that research and deveLopment work is guided more by practicaL
needs. Existing manufacturing capacity is to be modernized more quickly than
hitherto; the proportion of totaL investment channelLed into modernization and
equipment replacement is to increase from about a thi rd to 50%.
Despite the present faLL in export trade between the EC and the USSR, in the
Long term there are good opportunities for a considerable expansion of
economic and trade relations. The Soviet Union represents a market of 250
milLion peopLe; it has substantial raw materiaLs and energy resources, some of
which have scarcely been tapped, if at aLL. There is wide scope for
industriaL cooperation. If they are succes~fuLly pursued the mea~ures
introduced by the new Leadership to increase individuaL responsibi L ity, and
thereby the invoLvement of undertakings and employees in decisions on
production, will create a soLid basis for improved cooperation between the
Community and the Soviet Union in the economic sphere. ReLeased from the
shackLes of bureaucratic state planning, which often ignores reality, in the
ye.ars ahead the Soviet Union can deveLop into one of the strongest economic
powers in the world and thus become an important economic and tradi ng partner of the European Communities. 
(g) German Democrat i c Republ i c
At the beginning of the 1980s the GDR was faced with two serious foreign trade
problems: as a resuLt of unexpectedLy Large repayments on Loans from western
banks it had to consoLidate its trade with the West, and at the same time the
GDR was being pressed by the Soviet Union to reduce its trade deficit with
that country. By achieving a substantial increase in its exports to the West,
coupled with sLower growth in imports, the GDR succeeded in recording a
surpLus in its trade with the West. Between 1980 and 1984 its exports doubLed
while imports increased by only 25%. Energy and mineraL raw materiaLs account
for a high proportion of exports, whi Le exports of machinery and consumer
goods have achieved only a modest success. . The., trade deficit with the Soviet
Union was onLy reduced by choking off imports. The nominaL increase in
imports from the Soviet Union between 1981 and 1984 of about 50% is soLeLy
attributabLe to price increases at the time, particularly for oi L. In reaL
terms imports have stagnated.
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sarne year the trade surpLus with the West was about US$1 300 milLion. The
most important trading partner within the CMEA continues to be the Soviet
Union, which accounts for almost 40% of the GOR' s foreign trade. Its main
imports from the Soviet Union are oi L, i ron and steeL products, whi le it
exports machinery and vehicLes to the Soviet Union.
At the end of 1985 the GDR' s hard-currency foreign debt was sti Ll
US$6 800 million. The rate at which trade with the Community countries
increases is Likely to be slow. For the GDR, the shortage of energy, raw
materials and capital goods is a major factor affecting future deveLopment.
ConsequentLy, Like most other CMEA countries the GDR wiLL have to give
priority to boosting producti vity and at the same time reducing consurnption of
energy .and raw materiaLs.
Trade between the Federal RepubLic of Germany and the GDR is on a special
footing. The protocoL on German internaL trade and connected probLems
provides that the appLication of the Treaties of Rome shalL have no effect on
the speciaL nature of this trade. Even after the signing of the
GrundLagenventrag ' (Basic TreaJ;y) and its recognition by the other Community
Member States, the organization of German internal economic relations thus
remains the excLusive responsibi lity of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
conomic terms the resuLt of this special status is that goods from the GOR
have preferential access to the West German market (exemption from duties and
Levies, reduced value added tax, separate and liberaL quota poLicy), ,which
boosts trade considerably. The GOR, on the other hand, ha.s not covered its
speciaL reLations with the Federal Republic of Germany by formaL arrangements
within the CMEA. The rapporteur s discussions in East Berlin cLearLy
revealed, however, that whi Le the GDR supports cLoser relations between the
CMEA and the EC and is itseLf prepared to deveLop economic and trade reLations
with the Community on the basis of reciprocity and non-discrimination, it is
keen to ensure that these reLations do not disrupt or even affect its special
economic ties with the FederaL Republic.
VI. ConcLusi ons
Even if there appears to be limited scope at present for any rapid and
comprehensive expansion of economic reLations between the Community and the
the CMEA member states, the opportunity to improve reLations with the Eastern
European states and the Soviet Union in the economic sphere shouLd nonetheLess
be taken. C Loser reLations in a LL the areas mentioned can be a major European
contribution to detente between East and West. Economic interdependence in
Europe, generated by more joint ventures" Licensing agreements, easier
arrangements for reciprocaL investment and, above aLL, a narrowing of the
technoLogy gap, can Lead to a more permanent stabi l i zation of detente and
peace between East and West within Europe. The structuraL changes brought
about by technoLogy which are now taking place in Western Europe set new tasks
for East-West cooperation. They may Lead to new openings for a division of
Labour between Western and Eastern Europe. In addition, the economic
situation in CentraL and South America and in Africa makes any appreciabLe
expansion of economic reLations between the -Gommu.nity and these parts of the
worLd highLy improbable in the foreseeable futur~.- The development regions of
the world are the Pacific Basin, Southern Asia, and aLso the European CMEA
states in the Soviet Union. Since European exporters sti II find it difficult
to gai n a foothoLd in markets in the Paciti c Basi n, Eastern Europe offers them
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the interests of the deveLopment of the European Community to help ensure that
technoLogical change makes good progress in Eastern Europe, because economic
and trade reLations wi II onLy reaLLy flourish if Western and Eastern Europe
reach a comparabLe level of economic achievement.
The first cautious attempts to release undertakings from the rigid pLanning
bureaucracy and give them more organizational freedom can be perceived in all
the CMEA countries. This wi Ll certainly be a Long-term pro.CesS. OnLy when
industries in the CMEA states are forced to face up to competition in the
worLd market wi II the much-needed infLuence from abroad on the economies of
the CMEA countries help bring about long-overdue structuraL reforms.
In the Long term, the process of improving relations between East and West in
Europe in economic and related areas which has now begun may mark the start of
a process of bringing the two separated halves of Europe together. A process
of poLitical cooperation may develop out of economic cooperation. Just as a
partnership on an equaL footing is increasingLy deveLoping between the
European Community and the United States, these cLoser East-West reLations may
aLso Lead to a partnership between the whole of Europe, on one hand, and the
Soviet Union, on the other" which is absolutely essentiaL for Lasting peace in
Europe and the long-term prevention of East-West conflict.
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Figures in million ECU
IMPORTS
ANNEX I
Count ry 1985 1958 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
. YugosLavia
Sovi et Uni on
GDR
PoLand
, CzechosLovakia
Hunga ry
Romani a
BuLgaria
186
472
219
139
710
1543
225
667
466
366
449
1062
3899
494
1624
851
702
892
204
2172
11214
911
2723
1505
1415
1767
478
2211
13541
1158
2062
1564
1461
1829
555
2763
17045
1293
2256
1751
1534
1770
589
3530
18615
1414
2415
1873
1662
1819
529
4310
22430
1636
3290
2115
1864
3003
514
4326
20266
1745
3426
2222
1996
2846
550
EXPORTS
Count ry 1958 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Yugoslavi a 228 1431 2840 4199 4360 4278 4555 5048 4999
Soviet Umon 383 1410 4989 7583 7886 8984 12022 11985 11858
GDR 211 479 842 1048 710 792 855 810
PoLand 189 586 2677 2841 2307 2051 2074 2380 2681
zechos lovak i a 133 551 1045 1368 1385 1399 1451 1625 1926
Hunga ry 406 968 1592 1959 1962 1957 2159 2429
Romania 487 1070 1708 1699 1060 885 1017 1123
BuLgaria 224 678 774 963 1023 1095 1190 1575
Source: EUROSTAT
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FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS
BULGARIA Source: DIW (German Institute for
Econornic Research)
1971/75 1976/80 1981/85
1) REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN %
FRG
100 100 100
79. 76. 73.
76. 73. 71.
54. 52. 53.
21. 23. 26.
100 100 100
74. 79. 78.
72. 78. 76.
49. 57. 59.
25. 20. 21.
12. 10.
TOTAL EXPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRG
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
+0. -1.10 -3.
-1 .46- -0. 1)-1.
-0. -1. 1)-1.
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECD COUNTRIES, IN BILLION US$
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH' PERIOD IN BILLION US$
GROSS 2) 2.
NET 2) 1.
1) 1981-1984.-2)OECD estimate
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Economic Research)
1971/75 1976/80 1981/85
1) REGIONAL ST RUCTURE IN %
FRG
100 100 100
59. 59. 52.
57. 56. 49.
32. 32. 29.
40. 40. 47.
20. 19. 22.
100 100 100
51. 52. 61.
49. 50. 57.
26. 30. 36.
48. 47. 38.
26. 22. 18.
TOTAL EXPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRG
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
+0. -0. -4.
-6. -9. +2.
-0. -1. +1.
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECD COUNTRIES" IN BILLION US$
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH PERIOD IN BILLION US$
GROSS 25.
24.
30.
NET 28.
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Economic Research)
1971/75 1976/80 1981/85
1) REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN %
FRG
100 100 100
70. 72. 73.
65. 67. 68.
32. 35. 41.
29. 27. 26.
13. 12. 10.
100 100 100
68. 70. 77.
63. 66. 72.
31. 34. 44.
31. 29. 22.
14. 13.
TOTAL EXPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRG
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
-0. -0. -1.
-1. -3. -0.
-0. -0. 1 )+0.
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECD COUNTRIES, IN BILLION US$
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH PERIOD IN BILLION US$
GROSS 2) 3.
NET 2) 2.
1) 1981-1984.-2)OECD estimate
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Economic Research)
1971 1976/80 1981/85
1) REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN %
TOTAL EXPORTS
FRG
100 100 100
49. 46. 45.
41. 39. 39.
21. 18. 19.
50. 53. 54.
24. 21. 21.
100 100 100
45. 42. 50.
39. 35. 45.
18. 16. 22.
54. 57. 50.
27. 18. 11.
11.
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRG
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECD COUNTRIES, IN BILLION US$
WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
+0. +0. +0.
-1. -1 . )+6. 57
-0. +0. 1)+1.
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH PERIOD IN BILLION US$
GROSS 2) 6.
NET 2) 6.
1) 1981-1984.-2)OECD estimate
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Economic Research)
197 /75 197 /80 81/85
1) REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN %
FRG
100 100 100
69. 59. 56.
65. 54. 51.
35. 29. 32.
30. 41. 43.
15. 18. 16.
100 100 100
63. 52. 53.
60. 49. 48.
33. 28. 29.
36. 47. 46.
18. 22. 21.
11. 11.
TOTAL EXPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOC IALI ST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRG
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
-0. -0. +0.
-1 . -3. -1 .
-0. -1. -1.
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECDCOUNTRIES, IN BILLION US$
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH PERIOD IN BILLION US$
GROSS 1)10.
NET 1) 8.
1) OECD estimate
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Economic Research)
/75 1976/80 981/85
1) REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN %
FRG
100 100 100
59. 56. 56.
54. 52. 51.
12. 10. 10.
40. 43. 43.
13. 17. 19.
100 100 100
57. 55. 56.
53. 51. 50.
12. 10. 10.
42. 44. 43.
14. 15. 13.
TOTAL EXPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRG
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
-1 . 03 +5. +9.
- 7. -10. +0.
-3. - 3. +6.
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECD COUNTRIES, IN BILLION US$
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH PERIOD IN BILLION US$
NET
10. 18. 1)30. GROSS
10. 1) 19.
1) OECD estimate
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Economic Research)
1971/75 1976/80 1981/85
1) REGIONAL STRUCTURE IN %
FRG
100 100 100
72. 72. 64.
68. 68. 62.
36. 35. 36.
27. 27. 35.
16. 16. 16.
100 100 100
64. 65. 66.
62. 62. 64.
33. 35. 40.
35. 34. 33.
17. 14. 14.
TOTAL EXPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
FRS
USA
TOTAL IMPORTS
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
CMEA COUNTRIES
SOVIET UNION
NON-SOC IALIST COUNTRIES
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
USA
2) BALANCE OF TRADE (CUMULATIVE VALUES)
WITH SOVIET UNION, IN BILLION TRBL
WITH OECD COUNTRIES, IN BILLION US$
+0. -1 . -1 .
-3. -7. +2.
-0. -0 . +0. WITH FRG, IN BILLION US$
3) HARD-CURRENCY DEBT; SITUATION AT END OF EACH PERIOD IN BILLION US$
GROSS 1) 7. 13. 2)12.
NET 11.1 2) 6.
1) 1977 2) OEC D est i mat e
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EC EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROPE BY C()I1V()DITY ClASSES IN 1985
- in percentage -
Eastern USSR DDR Poland CzechosLo- I-t..nga ry Rumania B.Jlgaria ALbania
vakia
Total 100. 100. 100.(1'1. 100.(1'1. 100.(1'1. 100. 100. 100. 100.
of whi ch
Food,beverages 11. 14. 16. 12. 10.
and tobacco
Raw materials
Energy
AnimaL and 0.2
vegetabLe oi Ls
and fats
ChemicaLs 15. 13. 14. 19. 18. 19. 21. 15.
Machinery and 27. 24. 19. 29. 34. 30. 19. 37.
t ransporteq.Ji p-
ment .
Other man..Jfactured 34. 39. 23. ~6. 26. 34. 33. 24.
goods-
Source: External Trade" MonthLy Statistics, No. 3, 1986, EUROSTAT.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
tab Led by Mr EB.EL, Mrs BOOT, Mr ZAHORKA, Mr RAFTERY, Mr van AERSSEN, Mrs van ROOY
Mr POETSCHKI , Mr SCHON, Mr SPATH andMr KLEPSCH
on behalf of the Group of the European PeopLe s Party pursuant to RuLe 47 of the
Rules of Procedure on reLations between the EEC and COMECON (Doc. B 2-49/85)
IQ~_5~rQQ~~~_r2rl  i~~sO!,
A - alarmed at the growing competition in virtually aLL sectors of Community
trade from C:);'1i:CON.. whid"; is unfairly expLolting the advantages it derives
from the international Gear-air.ati.)n of t:conom;c plar:ning,
B - concerned at the resulting criticaL state of the Community Labour market
in this sector..
C - ,;onv;nced that tr.e regressive measures ;litherto considered by the Commission
are impr3cticable and ine;7e~tive,
D - concerned at t~e unnecessary ~Uild~UP of the potential for conflict between
tnet~o European economic 3reas,
E - dlarmea ~t tne contlnulng lack  of  formal 3greements with the COMECON countries
except RC'Ti:inia,
F - 3nxious to ~revent the f~r:her iSoLation  oT  COMECON, which would be
extremel~ d~tr ~ent3l to our 0wn eco0omy,
G - seeking to co~nIeract 3 ::rifting Jpart cf ~~~ two eccnomlC areas, and
~~ere~y to heLp :0 overcome :ne ~ar~i tier. Jf ~urope; ~ishing also to
secure gre3,er freedc~ of 2c~iQ~ for the CC~~CGN cou~:ries of eastern
Central Europe 'Jis-i:;-vis :;" USS;,( .3nd to r;,ake a contribution of its own
to overcaminq tr,e ' bloc ,':entaLi-::y ' in the economic sphere
; :3E~~2Q_!b~_;~~oi ~2iQQ
To res~me fortl"with talks to e~tJblish for~al relations bet~een the EEC
and CC~ECCN ~~i c~ ~rc~e dc~~ at tre cegi~n' ~g of the 1980s because both
parties irresPG~sicty enga~ ~d i~ petty ~urcaucratic wrangling Dver terms
of retere:-ce;
To take steps cO .:.:;nC~iJC:2 d  fr3:11i:?':iorK  ;;;greement with :Ci;I:::=.CON - in compliance
~itn lan8-st3~Ji~g JopeaLs frc~ Ire business and 5cie~tific cG~~Lnities-
which wi L~  "er' Je  tt.e interests of Goth "he e&3tern Cer,:r3L c:uropean states
and  of 0U:- own economy;
To incor~Qrate in t~is ag~ee~ent a go0d~ill or cc~petitiGn cLause obliging
the cC~~C:~ cn~ntr~es ~ en t::e  ~ATT  ~odel - t~ refrain from any further
unfair ex~ioit3~icn ~n cer~~~n eco~omic seciOfs of their dominant market
oosition , Wr, lc~ is th2' re::dlt c7 the ~nter;;ational coordination of economic
pL~nning ~ithin CC~EC0N ~rd is cLearly akin to the for~ation of an inter-
nat icnat carteL;
Irs~ruct5 its ~;~sid~nt to forward t~is resolution to the Ccmmissionof
the Eur00ean CG~~uni ties.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT B 2-558/85)
tabLed by Mr MATTINA
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on relations between the European Community and the Soviet Union
The European Parliament,
having regard to the ideas on reLations between the Soviet Union and
Comecon and the European Community expounded by the new General Secretary
of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhai L Gorbachev, at his recent meeting
with the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, President-in-Office of the
CounciL
whereas it is necessary to sound out the new Soviet Leadership
wiLLingness to establish .economic relations with the European Community,
in order to put an end to the dipLomatic si Lence between the two haLves of
Europe
whereas the institution of formaL reLations between the European Community
and Comecon is an essentiaL precondition for consoLidating Europe s roLe
in the preservation of world peace, as a pivot of detente between East and
West and North and South
warmLy appLauding the Italian Presidency for the commitment it has shown
to enhancing the Community s image abroad at the very highest leveLs, by
bringing the negotiations onSpani sh and Portuguese accession to .
successfuL conc lusion and consoLidating economic and politicaL relations
with thi rd countries,
Expresses keen interest in the possibi Lity of estabLishing formal
relations with Comecon and the Soviet Union;
WeLcomes the dipLomatic overtures made by the Soviet General Secretary,
r~ikhai L Gorbachev, and the firm pledge by the Italian Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi , to encourage this process of rapprochement;
CaLLs on the Council of Ministers and the Commission to open a reguLar and
fruitfuL diaLogue with Comecon and the Soviet Union;
Instructs its President to invite, on behalf of ParLiament, the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communi st Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, to Strasbourg
for an official visit to the European Parliament;
Instructs its competent committee to draw up a report on the state of the
European Community s reLations with Come.con and the Soviet Union;
Instructs its President to forward thiS' resGlution to the Counci Land
Commission of the European Communities and the Goverment of the Soviet
Union.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT B 2-643/85)
tabLed by Mr PORDEA Mr DE CAIVJARET and Mr ROMUALDI
pu~suant to Rule 47 of the RuLes of Procedure
on the resumption of negotiations between the EEC and Comecon
The European ParLiament
noting the moves made by the Soviet Union to re.sume negotiations aimed
at estabLishing ' normal' reLations between the Counti L for MutuaL
Economic Assistance and  the  European Community and having regard to
the Declaration of 12. 1985 by the Foreign Ministers of the Member
States of the fEC concerning the strengthening of relations ~ith the
countries of Eastern Europe,
noting that Comecon s official request mentions ' pan-European
cooperation consequent upon the signature of the FinaL Act of the
HeLsinki Conference and that the USSR at this juncture seems ready
tortJnsider the European Community asa 'politicaL entity ' and
discuss the worLd' s 'concrete probLems ' with it,
recalLing the staLemate reached in previous contacts between the EEC
and Comecon in 1974 and 1978, which became even more evident at the
Geneva  meet  ing in 1980 and was indi rect ly conti rmedby the Haferkamp
Letter of 1981
aware that the Comecon initiative comes after something of an
improvement in the current accounts balance of the Eastern bloc
countries - which is reflected in a sLight decrease ;n their foreign
debt - and that whi Lst wishing to exploit its advantages in certain
economic sectors , the USSR' s main aims are, firstly, to soothe the
growing irritation feLt by its ' sateLLites , by adopting a favourable
overalL attitude towards the West , which wouLd thus no Longer be
tempted to impose economic sanctions; secondly, to forestall the
inevitabLe protectionist measures on the Cor:;munity r:uket ..,",icb
wouLd harm exports from the East to the Community and , finaLly, to
try to steer Comecon towards competitive~ess with th~ EEC , by ma~ing it catch up in various fields, including the field ::.~ hig1', techn(jl.og~
considering that any organized expansion of East-We~: traoe would be
hampered by the ideoLogical , politicaL and military sutstruc:ure ot
this economic alliance, ln .ihich the aLLegia.-.ce 0-; :ne peo::'
oemocracies ' to the dominant super-pow~r is practica. ~y una~estioning
and whose network of interdependence includes ~ongCL i6, V~etna~ ~nd
Cuba (there are a~o cooperation agreements wit~ Ira~, Me)i~c ana
FinLand) , whilst its main (European) sector is the scene 0
+ ""
,ternal
strife resulting fro,." conflicting national lnterests; a funner
hindrance would be the inflexibiLity- tne whole Corre::on macrinery,
which is due to the fact that in the mem~;r cQu~trie5 the State and
the Communist Party are one and the same an~ t~?: i~s1eac c+ 1ne
supranational framework necessary for true econoC'. ic integrat~o.-. , there
is a transnational system characterized by Socia\is: lnterna:ionaclStr
centraLized pLanning, artificially fixeG pritt's  ar.C e):r,ange rates ane non- convertible national currencies
Endorses the European Lommunity s favourable response to tne overtures
from Comecon (USSR) , but urges that renewed dialogue arid a'i)' IT,utuaL
recognitlon in principle between the two boa~es shouLa not lna~ce the
EEC to make any one-tlded concessions ana tna: toe po~'tlca~ s Qnifican:e ano consequent r,umanitarian implications of suer. moves snout.c be stressed
unambl guot.,Js l)';
- 45 - PE 107.407/fin.Stresses that the resumption of these negotiations offers an
opportunity for the European Community to express its disapprovaL
of the Soviet Union s despotic ~omination of Comecon and to persuade
the Soviet Union to abide by its undertakings concerning human
rights, slacken its hoLd on the countries of Eastern Europe and
improve the Living conditions and quaL ity of Life of the peoples
of these countries;
BeL ieves that the form of economic agreement to be negotiated shouLd
be confined to bi lateraL agreements drawn up with the USSR and its
European 'satelLites , ruLing out the possibi Lity of ~n actuaL
fundamentaL compromise consisting in conducting formal relations
with Comecon as such - aLthough this organization has just been
mad~a 'legaL entity ' at the Warsaw summit in June 1985 - since
without creating any major economicadv.antages, such a compromise
would constitute another form of recognition for the regime imposed
in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union;
Suggests that the contacts envisaged shouLd largeLy be modelled on
the positive results of the EEC-Yugoslavia Co-operation Counci l , on
the outcome of the meet ings of experts of the Community and the
United Nation.s Economic Commission for Europe, which were aimed at
strengthening industrial cooperation between East and West
especialLy through joint ventures , and on the relations between the
EEC and Romania, the onLy Eastern bloc country which has officially
recognized it, concluding an agreement on industrial and agricultural
trade with it in  1980 which should soon be folLowed by a
coope rat ion ag reement;
Instructs its Presi~ent to forward this resolutior to the Commission
of the European Communities.
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PART II
Texts adopted by the European Parliament
1. Relations between the European Community and the CMEA
Doc. A2-187/86
RESOLUTION
on relations between the European Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) and the Eastern European member states of the CMEA
The European Parliament.
having regard to its resolution of II October 1982 on .relations between the European
Community and the East European State-trading countries and COMECON (I
having regard to its resolution of 9 July 1982 on relations between the EEC and the COM-
ECON countries in the field of transport policy  e),
having regard to its resolutJon of 24 October 1985 on relations between the European
Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (3),
having regard to its resolution of 13 June 1986 on trade relations between the European
Community and Hungary (4),
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EBEL and others, on behalf of the
EPP Group, on relations between the EEC and COMECON (Doc. B2-49/85),
having .regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Mattina on relations between the
European Community and the Soviet Union
(Doc. B2-558/85),
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Pordea and others on the
resumption of negotiations between the EEC and COMECON
(Doc. B2-643/85),
having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic Relations (Doc. A2-
187/86),
A. deploring the absence of political freedom which pertains throughout Eastern Europe,
B. having regard to the Helsinki Final Act and the results of the meetings following up the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Belgrade and Madrid
C. stressing that for many years it has wished to contribute towards improving relations between
the EC and the Member States of the CMEA, provided that .certain preconditions are
met
D. whereas the improvement of trade and political relations between the EC and the CMEA will
help gradually to overcome the problem of the division of Europe and change substantially
the spirit of Yalta with regard to the division of zones of influence and control between the
two superpowers,
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E. whereas the partition of Europe is contrary to the tradition of intellectual, cultural and
economic ties between Eastern and Western Europe, whereas it contributes to the polariza-
tion of world politics into a power struggle between the two superpowers, and whereas the
aim of Community policy is to overcome this partition of Europe and strive for the achieve-
ment of the right to self-determination in all parts of Europe,
F. conscious that Europe as a whole plays a vital role in maintaining and safeguarding peace in
the world, whereby Europe can act as a bridge between the two superpowers and, at the same
time, must strive for greater independence vis- vis those superpowers
G. aware of the legal nature and rules of the CMEA and the extent of its competence to act on
behalf of the member states of the CMEA, which is extremely limited in comparison with the
competence of the EC,
H. aware also that the CMEA is fully entitled to conclude framework agreements by virtue of the
powers attributed to it,
I. whereas, unlike the European Community, the CMEA has one of the two superpowers as a
member, and the USSR therefore has a powerful influence over this organization, while the
. USA is not a member of the EC and thus there is no comparable dominant position within
the EC, which sees itself as an economic partner with equal rights alongside the USA,
whereas the CMEA includes not only Eastern European countries but also three non-
European member-states whose economic and trade interests differ considerably from those
of the other CMEA countries, but whereas, on the other hand, the European Community has
many more preferential agreements with developing countries, so that the three non-Euro-
pean CMEA countries referred to cannot constitute an obstacle to closer cooperation
K. having regard to the activities and the agreements reached within the framework of the
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in the sphere of cooperation between the countries
of Western and Eastern Europe
L. having regard to the recent contacts between the EC and the CMEA and to the mutual interest
in taking up and developing relations, including possible mutual recognition by the two
organizations,
M. having regard to the positive response by all the East European states to the Commission
offer to normalize their relations with the Community,
N. having regard notably to the special relations obtaining between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and having regard also to the ' Berlin
clause, desired by the 12 Member States of the Community and specifying that West Berlin
enjoys Community status,
O. whereas the levels of development and properity of the CMEA countries are lower than those
of the EC countries, a fact which is largely due to their extensive commercial isolation, their
autarkic regime and the rigidity of their economic system
P. whereas the Eastern European member states of the CMEA, and particularly the USSR, are
putting forward plans aimed at integrating their economies in the international market circuit
and liberalizing certain sectors of the economy, as a vital precondition for improving the
internal economic situation of these countries,
Q. desiring to improve relations between the EC and the CMEA in all possible areas of mutual
benefit, and at the same time to improve and extend trade and economic relations between
the EC and the Eastern European members of the CMEA
R. whereas the creation of mutually advantageous relations could be a further step towards
maintaining peace and overcoming the partition of Europe in the long term and that such a
step is now more important than ever, given the emerging trend in relations between the two
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believing that by securing agreements between the EEC and the CMEA their member states
will make a decisive contribution towards overcoming dumping and 'anti-dumping practices
in their trade relations and expanding trade
T. having regard to the fundamental differences existing between our democratic societies,
which are based essentially on the guarantee and enjoyment of individual rights, and the
totalitarian regimes of the Eastern bloc countries, and whereas these differences are a source
of genuine incompatability and as a result efforts should be concentrated on the rights and
freedoms of the citizens of those totalitarian countries,
Re relations between the EC and the CMEA and the member states of the CMEA
I. Regrets that in the eleven years since the first talks were held between the EC and the CMEA
in 1975 neither the CMEA nor any of its Member States has formally recognized the EC;
2. Takes the view that the climate of genuine trust, which is required for the .achievement of
better economic relations, can only be created if measures are taken which lead to mutual
disarmament;
3. Supports the Commission for the consistent policy it has adopted towards the CMEA as a
result of which the latter has now agreed that the establishment of relations between the two
institutions shall not prejudice bilateral relations between the EC and the member states of the CMEA; 
4. Looks to The European Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to
draw up a common declaration in the near future granting each other mutual recognition under
international law and to establish diplomatic ties between the East European countries and the
Community;
5. Believes that mutual recognition under international law and the establishment of diplo-
matic ties will contribute decisively to the development of both multilateral and bilateral rela-
tions between the Member States of the two organizations;
6. Considers that relations between the EC and the CMEA .can only be developed and extended
if the latter clearly recognizes the existence of the EC under international law as well as its
competence to act in economic and trade matters;
7. Recognizes that the establishment of official relations between the EC and the CMEA would
create a propitious climate for developing relations with individual CMEA countries in the field
offoreign trade and cooperation, but considers that it is unnecessary at this stage to lay down the
details of cooperation between the EC and the CMEA in the common declaration and that
separate negotiations should be held to this end following official contacts;
Re the possibility of reaching ag,'eements between the EC and the CMEA
8. Expects the EC to consider actively the possibility of concluding arrangements with the
CMEA, if appropriate, on such matters of mutual interest as fall within its sphere of compe-
tence;
9. Assumes that parallel negotiations will be opened or resumed between the EC and the
CMEA and between the EC and the European member states of the CMEA on outstanding
matters;
10. Considers that, in the event of such developments occurring, the two organizations might
then discuss issues such as:
the approximation of standards,
the approximation of the bases of statistical surveys so as to facilitate exchanges and com-
parisons of data,
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II. Believes that, in addition to these matters on which .an agreement in principle had already
been reached in earlier EC-CMEA talks, there are further possibilities for mutually advantageous
cooperation which, however, will often require more extensive preparatory work before they can
be realized;
12. Considers, in this connection, that the CMEA and the EC might, if appropriate, hold
neg()tiations on environmental protection problems with the aim of developing common princi-
ples and standards for permissible limit values as regards pollution in the air, soil, in rivers and in
the sea, provided that the CMEA has authority for these matters;
13. Considers that joint negotiations could be held on the development of transport infrastruc~
tures in Europe, since the current lack of viable transport links between the two blocs is a serious
obstacle to any type of trade or mutual economic relations;
14. Considers desirable the development of an energy system for the whole of Europe, partic-
ularly for the supply of electricity, so as to .establish a major inter-European network of energy
suplies and mutual services;
I S. Considers that the exploration .of new sources of energy, and notably nuclear fusion, but
also alternative sources of energy provide ample opportunities for research cooperation;
16. Is anxious in view of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster that in addition to efforts through the
IAEA, cooperation might be established with CMEA States as regards reactor security and mutual
aid in cases of reactor malfunctionings, and that there should be a duty to provide information
together with exchanges of information and a joint acceptance of responsibility;
17. Considers furthermore, that it would benefit both sides if scientific cooperation in precisely
defined areas were stepped up, provided that the necessary strategic interests of Western Europe
are properly guaranteed;
18. Believes that the CMEA and its member states are particularly interested in material
cooperation with the EC in the development of scientific coop~ration and that this should be
borne in mind in future negotiations, and observes the interest shown by several Eastern bloc
countries in the EUREKA research programme, in which not only the Member States of the EC
but also other European countries are taking part; 
19. Believes that serious consideration should be given to ways in which the number of
products requiring authorization could be reduced, having due regard to the West's security
. interests  i.e. ensuring civil end-use ~, as this might help improve and consolidate rela-
tions;
Re institutional contacts
20. Desires that, once mutual recognition has been secured and the question of the recognition
of the EC by the individual Member States of the CMEA has been settled, the European
Parliament delegations for relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European member
states of the CMEA should become operational;
Re trade and economic ties with the Eastern European members of the CMEA
21. Recalls the very considerable disparity between the economic strength of the Eastern
European state-trading countries and of the EC and the effect this will have on the development of
trade and economic relations with the EC;
22. Believes that difficult economic problems will arise as a result of the different economic
structures and that free reciprocal competition will thus only be possible to a very limited degree
so that the EC will receive nothing comparable in return for facilitating access to its markets;23. 2. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 46/75
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23. - Draws attention to the adverse effect of the declining price of oil and the drastic fall in the
exchange rate of the dollar on export revenues, and on those of the USSR and Romania in
particular, which has markedly reduced their ability to take imports from industrialized countries
in the West;
24. Believes, however, that an improvement of economic relations will be politically useful as
regards:
stability and detente in Europe,
the gradual elimination of the partition of Europe,
the implementation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation
and, in the long-term, the strengthening of the role of the whole of Europe as a factor
maintaining peace;
25. Believes that an immediate gradual reduction is necessary in compensation trade between
the CMEA and the EC;
26. Notes with interest the USSR's declaration of intent to join GATT and believes that the
negotiation to this end should be pursued constructively, a prospect which will have a positive
impact on international trade and, notably, on the Community s trade interests;
27. Stresses the need for the European Community to seek and develop new markets;
28. Considers that in the medium term, the member states of the CMEA have considerable
potential as an export market for the EC because of their considerable reserves of evergy and raw
materials, particularly in the USSR, because of the CMEA countries' great demand for invest-
ment and development and, particularly in the case of the Eastern European member states,
because of their geographical proximity;
29. Would like the EC to conclude trade and/or cooperation agreements with the European
member states of the CMEA as soon as possible and thereby to put an end to a situation which is
not governed by treaty and has in several cases lasted for years;
30. Realizes, however, that the EC market will only be able to absorb industrial products from
the CMEA states if they are made much more competitive;
31. Notes the Romania is the only CMEA country with which the EC has so far concluded a
comprehensive trade agreement on industrial goods and that its agreements with Poland, Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are limited to steel, textiles and some- agricultur;:tl pro-
ducts;
32. Welcomes the fact that the Eastern European member stateS of the CMEA have now all
agreed to the Commission s offer to conclude trade and cooperation agreements and recalls that in
1.974 Romania alone accepted the EC's offer to conclude a trade agreement;
33. Welcomes the current negotiations between the Commission and Romania aimed at
extending the scope of the 1980 agreement so as to extend and develop trade and economic ties
between the EC and Romania;
34. Expresses its wishes that negotiations between Hungary and other CMEA Member States
and the Community should commence as soon as possible and hopes that they will lead in the
near future to an agreement acceptable to both parties;
35. Considers that fruitful cooperation is only possible if the CMEA states abandon their
ideologically based desire for self-sufficiency from imports from the Western industrial
nations;
36. Believes that one of the principal means by which foreign trade policy can generate mutual
trust and thus influence other areas of policy-making is by strengthening trade contacts and
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37. Isstm concerned at the aggressive prices policy pursued by state transport undertakings in
CMEA countries which consists in considerably under.cutting the freight rates for road and sea'
transport and so gradually to excl ude EC transport undertakings from the market, and calls on the
Commission to bring this matter up notably in future negotiations with the USSR and to press for
a solution to this problem;
38. Regrets that the lack of convertibility of CMEA currencies amongst themselves and with
the currencies of the Western industrialized nations continues to binder the development of
economic relations;
39. Welcomes Hungary s efforts to make its currency partially convertible;
40. Believes that, in trade with the Eastern European CMEA states, the ECU could prove an
advantageous monetary and financial instrument for the financing, invoicing and payment of
foreign trade transactions; calls on the Commission to examine how better use might be made of these possibilities; 
41. Calls on the Commission to include the intensification of agricultural trade in trade talks
with Eastern European CMEA states with the aim of stepping up EC agricultural exports to
CMEA states and facilitate the access of agricultural imports from CMEA countries to the EC
market;
42. Views the high indebtedness of some CMEA countries as a severe impediment to the
development of trade relations;
43. Recognizes Romania s efforts to reduce its debts to the West, which, however, was
achieved mainly by means of drastic import restrictions;
44. Is sceptical about Poland's ability to master its worsening debt problem unaided and
believes that possible solutions should be considered, taking into account Poland' s ability to pay;
insofar as its debts exceed its capacity to pay, a study should be made to ascertain the feasibility of
collecting the capital and interest payments due in a development fund in Poland and with these
resources promoting development projects in the country (the swaps model) until the Polish
economy is in a position to service and repay this capital in hard currency;
45. Considers that the normalization of the Community s relations with the Eastern European
countries must involve the recognition by these countries of the role and the place of the
Community as such in multilateral bodies;
46. Reserves the right to ratify the arrangements with the CMEA and its member states
negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the Council on behalf of the Community;
47. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of Ministers, the Commis-
sion, the General Secretariat of the CMEA and the governments of the Eastern European member
states of the CMEA.